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VI 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
PI aintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
BECKY LYNNE DRAPER, : Case No. 20040879-CA 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (2002). 
The Information charges Appellant/Defendant Becky Lynne Draper ("Appellant" or 
"Ms. Draper") with one count of child endangerment, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2003) (the "child endangerment statute"1). R. 01. 
Ms. Draper timely petitioned this Court for interlocutory review of an order dated 
October 1, 2004. R. 159-69. See order being appealed from in Addendum A. This 
Court granted Ms. Draper's request for interlocutory review on the issues set forth below. 
See this Court's Order granting interlocutory review in Addendum B. 
1
 Although Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 applies to children and elder adults, for 
the purposes of this brief, Appellant refers to the statute as the child endangerment statute 
and discusses the statute as it applies to children. Because the statute treats children and 
elder adults identically, any decision regarding the application of the statute to children 
would also apply to elder adults. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue 1. Whether the child endangerment statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
112.5(2) (2003), is void for vagueness in that it (a) fails to give notice that marijuana and 
paraphernalia in the basement of a home where an infant resides or nursing a baby at 
some point after using an unspecified amount of marijuana constitutes child 
endangerment under the statute, and (b) fails to provide minimal guidelines for 
enforcement, thereby allowing the crime of child endangerment to be prosecuted in an 
arbitrary and discriminatory fashion. 
Standard of Review. "'Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of 
law, which [are reviewed] for correctness.5" State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, f!2, 99 P.3d 
820 (quoting Provo Citv Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, ^|5, 86 P.3d 735) (citations 
omitted)). Statutes are presumed constitutional and a party challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute "'bear[s] the burden of demonstrating its 
unconstitutionality.'" Green, 2004 UT 76, f42 (quoting Greenwood v. Citv of N. Salt 
Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991)). Moreover, "[t]he constitution tolerates a greater 
degree of vagueness in civil statutes than in criminal statutes." Green, 2004 UT 76, [^43 
(citing Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d362 (1982)). 
Preservation. This issue was preserved by written motion and argument held at a 
hearing on September 13, 2004. R. 29-42, 180. The trial court entered a memorandum 
2 
decision denying the motion to quash the bindover. R. 159-69; see Addendum A. 
Issue 2. Whether the state failed to demonstrate probable cause to believe that 
Ms. Draper committed child endangerment by knowingly and intentionally allowing her 
child to ingest or be exposed to marijuana where the state's witness saw Ms. Draper 
nurse her baby on January 20, 2004 and Ms. Draper told the state's witness that she had 
used marijuana on New Year's Eve and January 9, 2004 but did not know that marijuana 
could pass to a baby who nursed. 
Standard of Review. The determination of whether to bind a defendant over for 
trial is a question of law. See State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1991). 
Accordingly, [this Court] review[s] that determination without deference to the court 
below. See id- at 465-66." State v. Clark. 2001 UT 9,1J8, 20 P.3d 300. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved below by written motion and argument at 
the hearing held on September 13, 2001. R. 29-42; 180. The trial court denied 
Ms. Draper's motion to quash the bindover based on its conclusion that the state 
establish probable cause to believe Ms. Draper committed the crime of child 
endangerment by nursing her child at some point after using marijuana. R. 125. 
TEXT OF STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The text of the following statute and constitutional provision are in Addendum C: 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2003). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state charged Ms. Draper with one count of child endangerment, occurring on 
or about January 9, 2004. R. 1-03. A preliminary hearing was held on May 3, 2004 
before the Honorable Stephen L. Roth, acting as a magistrate. R. 44-69. After the 
evidence was presented, Ms. Draper argued that the Information should be dismissed 
because the state failed to establish probable cause to bind her over on the charge of child 
endangerment. R. 62-64. The magistrate concluded that marijuana and paraphernalia 
found in the basement of the home where Ms. Draper, her husband and another adult 
resided with Ms. Draper's four-month-old son did not establish probable cause to bind 
over Ms. Draper on the child endangerment charge; the magistrate bound the case over, 
however, based on testimony that Ms. Draper admitted using marijuana on two occasions 
at least 11 days prior to being seen breast feeding her baby. R. 66. 
Following bindover, Ms. Draper filed a motion to declare the child endangerment 
statute unconstitutional and to quash the bindover of that charge. R. 35-49. The trial 
court held a hearing on September 13, 2004. R. 180. The court filed its written order 
denying the motion on October 1, 2004. R. 159-69; see Addendum A. 
This Court granted Ms. Draper's petition for interlocutory review of the denial of 
her motion on November 4, 2004. R. 171. Ms. Draper is not in custody. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 9, 2004, officers executed a search warrant at Appellant's home. 
4 
R. 46. At that time, Ms. Draper shared her home with her husband, Jimmie Elwood 
Draper, another adult named Jessica Hironas, and the Drapers' four-month-old son, D.D., 
who was born on September 8, 2003. R. 46, 52, 55, 57. 
During the search, officers found individually packaged marijuana, baggies, 
scales, money, a pay-owe sheet, a couple of bongs, and some pipes in a downstairs room. 
R. 48. Two bags tested positive for marijuana; one contained 8.7 grams and the other 
contained 9.9 grams of marijuana. R. 50-51. Those items, all of which were found 
downstairs, belonged to Jimmie Draper and were sent to the state crime lab with his 
name on them. R. 49-50, 52. Officers also found money in the bedroom Ms. Draper 
shared with her husband. R. 49. 
After being Mirandized, Ms. Draper acknowledged that her husband had been 
selling marijuana for 1 Vi years. R. 49. She also told the officer that her husband left the 
house to make his sales and nothing was sold out of the house. R. 54. 
Ms. Draper and her husband lived in an upstairs bedroom of the house. R. 53. 
Four-month-old D.D. also had an upstairs bedroom. R. 53. 
Karen Barnes, an investigator for the Division of Child and Family Services 
(DCFS), made an unannounced visit to Ms, Draper's home on January 20, 2004, R. 57. 
D.D. was present during the interview. R. 57. The purpose of Ms. Barnes' visit was to 
discuss allegations of child endangerment based on the police finding marijuana in the 
home. R. 57. Ms. Barnes asked Ms. Draper whether she was using or currently using 
5 
marijuana. R. 58. Ms. Draper told her "that she had only used twice since [D.D.] was 
born. One being New Year's Eve and the other being the day the police were at the 
home after they left the home." R. 58. 
While Ms. Barnes was at the home on January 20th, Ms. Draper started breast 
feeding D.D. R. 58. Ms. Barnes then talked to Ms. Draper "about the dangers of using 
and how marijuana and any other drugs go though the breast milk to the child." R. 58. 
Ms. Draper told the investigator "that she did not know that the marijuana would go 
though the breast milk to the child," and that she would not use again. R. 60. 
Ms. Barnes also told Ms. Draper that marijuana and paraphernalia needed to be 
out of the home, and Ms. Draper indicated that she thought her husband had removed 
everything but would follow up on that. R. 58. 
The magistrate concluded that marijuana found in the basement did not establish 
probable cause to believe Ms. Draper committed the crime of child endangerment in this 
case where the child was four months old, "not mobile and there is no indication that this 
child was placed in a position where it was placed at risk from any drugs." R. 66. On 
the other hand, the magistrate concluded that there was enough evidence to bind 
Ms. Draper over based on the charge of child endangerment for breast feeding her child. 
R.66. 
In ruling on the motion to declare the statute unconstitutional or quash the 
bindover, the trial judge considered both the nursing theory and the theory that marijuana 
6 
\I•• • -• * - .:.J,ii; . i:ic .. deciding that the statute does 
not violate due process. In ruling on the J -. : 
judge relied only on the nursing theory and concluded that there was probable cause to 
believe Ms. Draper committed the crime of child endangerment based on the evidence 
that she 111 irsed the cl nil :! R 168. 1 1 i : • :x: 1 11 t stated: 
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the State and 
drawing all reasonable inferences in the State's favor, the Court concludes 
that the State met its burden to bindover to show a reasonable belief that an 
offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it. As stated 
above,[ ]the Defendant was nursing her child and was an admitted drug 
user. A reasonable inference that the Defendant was using drugs prior to 
nursing her child can be made, therefore, the "ingested" portion of the 
statute may apply. Although there was testimony that the Defendant did 
not know that the drugs in her system would pass to her child when 
nursing, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable 10 the State 
and all reasonable inferences drawn in the State's favor. The Court 
concludes that there was enough evidence at the preliminary hearing U 
show that Defendant knowingly or intentionally caused her child to ingest 
or be exposed to a c""i,*^,,e<1 "-uhstnncc. chemical substance or drug 
paraphernalia 
R. 168. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
endangerment 
statute is void for vagueness. The statute is void for • .Mienes* h \ .r-•. - & u- • 
"exposed, to" is not defined and is subject to expansive interpretation and the statute fails 
to require danger or a significant risk of harm.... The broad term, "exposed to" coupled 
v all 1 tl 1 ;: faih ire t :> reqi lii e dai igei s ' iolates ciii le pi ocess because the statute (1) fai Is to give 
• 7 
notice to an ordinary person of the conduct that can be prosecuted under the child 
endangerment statute, and (2) fails to establish minimal standards for prosecution, 
thereby leaving the decision as to what can be prosecuted under the statute to police, 
prosecutors, judges, and juries. 
In the context of this case, the child endangerment statute failed to give notice to 
Ms. Draper that nursing her infant at some unspecified time after using marijuana, or 
having marijuana or paraphernalia in the basement of her home, would subject her to 
prosecution for child endangerment. Additionally, the arbitrary manner in which the 
statute is enforced is demonstrated by this case; while many officers would not have 
pursued child endangerment charges in this case based on evidence that Ms. Draper 
nursed her child eleven days after using marijuana or where the four-month-old child had 
no contact with the marijuana or paraphernalia and the items were downstairs, away from 
the child's room, the officers in this case chose otherwise. 
Because this statute is vague and cannot be saved by a limiting construction, it 
must be stricken. If this Court disagrees that this unconstitutional statute must be 
stricken and attempts to construe it to save it from its unconstitutional infirmities, 
the word "exposed to" must either be stricken or given a narrow construction and the 
statute must be read to include a requirement that the child was subjected to danger or a 
significant risk of harm. 
8 
jxcgcuui • .• •/. ^lcon^nui.. .... ne state failed to establish 
probable cause to believe that Ms. 'Draper committed tl K crin le of cl lild endangerment. 
The state failed to establish probable cause to believe that Ms, Draper nursed her chilu in 
close proximit) to using marijuana and failed to introduce credible evidence that nursing 
' • C t i : ' k 
of harm to the infant under the circumstances of this case. Additionally, alihr :::h ncmier 
the magistrate nor the trial judge relied on the state's theory that Ms, Draper endangered 
iijr —ua because marijuana was in the basement and that theory is therefore not a proper 
to believe Ms. Draper committed child endangerment under its drug exposure theory. 
The trial court's order upholding the bindover should therefore be reversed. 
A m,b MEN I 
POIN n . THE CHILD ENDANGERMENl S i AIU IE lb Vuib rUR 
VAGUENESS SINCE IT FAILS TO GIVE NOTICE THAT HAVING 
CONTRABAND IN THE HOME OR NURSING A CHILD VIOLATES 
THE STATUTE, AND BECAUSE IT ALLOWS ARBITRARY AND 
DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT. 
notice that having marijuana and paraphernalia out of reach in a house where an infant 
resides or that nursing a child at some point after using marijuana is prohibited conduct 
under the statute, and .iiso because the statute allows for arbitrary and discriminatory 
9 
the failure of the statute to require danger or a significant risk of harm results in a failure 
to provide notice that Ms. Draper's behavior could be prosecuted as child endangerment 
and also allows police officers, prosecutors, judges, and juries to decide what behavior is 
prohibited by the statute. Because the child endangerment statute is vague as applied in 
this case, it violates due process. See generally Green, 2004 UT 76, [^44 (citing Vill. of 
Hoffman Estates. 455 U.S. at 495, n.7). 
A. A STATUTE IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS WHEN IT FAILS TO 
GIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDUCT THAT IS PROHIBITED OR FAILS 
TO ESTABLISH MINIMAL GUIDELINES THEREBY ALLOWING 
ARBITRARY AND DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT. 
Principals of procedural due process prohibit the application of a statute that is 
vague. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^|43. A penal statute is unconstitutionally vague when it 
fails to "'define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement.'" Id. (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 
103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). 
A statute is vague, in violation of due process, if it violates either the notice or 
arbitrary enforcement aspect of the doctrine. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^[43. 
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that 
man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that 
laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may 
trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit 
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates 
10 
basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution on an 
ad hoc and subjective basis, ^'uu -he attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application 
Gravned v. City u . , ^lord, 408 L.S. iU4, 108-09 (1972) (footnotes omitted) (citations 
omitted). Courts have less tolerance for vague provisions that carry criminal penalties 
tl lan they do fc i vagueness u, ,.; •. A MJIUIC .. \ in. oi tiunman Estates, 455 ( J.S at 498-
99: Greem 20041 JT 76,1(43. 
The notice aspect of the vagueness doctrine requires that a statute be invalidated 
when the statute "fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people V) 
119 S.Ct. 1849, 1859, 144 L.Ed.2d 67, 80(1999). the purpose of this aspect oi the 
vagueness doctrine "is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct n» • lie 
law." Id. at 58 A loitering statute that made it a crime to "remain in any one place with 
no appj VM !•• *^ e "!"' l 
forbidden and what is permitted," and therefore violated this first aspect of the vagueness 
doctrine. Id at ~ >
 ; * : ~~ \ child endangerment statute that applied u> a iu" - »P ••<' 
"[pjlaces [a] dependent in a Miuaiioii mat may endanger h; - ;;;. wi IK\,..; . . AW.. •
 ; 
a : f ^ - . j ' n i i ^ . J . ' i v t ! > ! -•. ) 
violated this first aspect of the vagueness doctrine because it failed to give notice to 
persons of ordinary intelligence of the conduct proscribed by the statute. State v. 
Downe\, 4 '» A ._V. "  • 
Both aspects of the vagueness test are important and bear on whether the 
prohibitions of the statute are sufficiently defined so as to comply with due process. See 
Greenwood. 817 P.2d at 819 (quoting Kolender. 461 U.S. at 357). While the notice 
aspect of the vagueness doctrine is important, the vagueness requirement that the 
legislature establish minimal guidelines so as to protect against arbitrary enforcement is 
of even greater importance. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 557-58. 
Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and 
arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important 
aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other 
principal element of the doctrine - the requirement that a legislature 
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." Where the 
legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may 
permit "a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and 
juries to pursue their personal predilections." 
Id. This second aspect of the vagueness doctrine provides an "'independent reason' for 
deeming a criminal law void for vagueness when the challenged law authorizes arbitrary 
or discriminatory enforcement." United States v. Regan, 93 F. Supp. 2d 82, 87 (2000) 
(citing Morales, 527 U.S. at 56). 
The second prong of the vagueness doctrine forbids the delegation of "basic 
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective 
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications." Grayned, 
408 U.S. at 109. In determining whether "'the broad sweep of the ordinance . . . 
violates5 the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement" (Regan, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (citations omitted)), courts consider whether 
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:
-i . i ,'. /iiiauoiL;- -.*,. JAO^C cnargvw »\ ai. enforc ing the statute. IdL 
(cit ing inter alia Kolender i' *• »< •:. ' • • • • • , 
judges, or juries to decide whether a law has been violated offends "notions of fairness 
and concerns about government conduct," due process is violated when a statute fails to 
. J .u«- ea\ es uia, k.^. *ion to others. 
Id at 87-88. 
In this context, a court must consider whether the challenged law 
"necessarily entrusts lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgement of 
the police man on his beat. [ ] The arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement 
prong derives from both notions of fairness and concerns about arbitrary 
government conduct - both of which are as old as the Republic. The 
constitutional principle undergirding the Due Process Clause is that citizens 
should never be subjected to the whims of an unrestrained executive. 
Through the arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement prong of the 
vagueness challenge, an individual argues that because the particular law 
only vaguely defines the prohibited conduct, the relevant legislative or 
regulatory body has surrendered its lawmaking power to an executive 
official, thereby vesting complete discretion in that official. Thus, the age 
old thront of arbitrary govern™'*"* action is realized. 
& 
The procedural due process limitations against allowing police officers: J u n e - >r 
]>n-so N .•. • • -.. ite are well recognized. See e.g. Mora l e s , 527 
U . S . at 6 0 - 6 3 ; Regan, 93 F . Supp. 2d iv ^ Commonw calm \. i arier. * • *• ' s !, 
583 (Va A p p . 1995 ; .A loitering statute that does not contain guidel ines for 
enforcement and instead " ' p rov ides absolute discretion to police officers to de te rmine 
\\h.»t >u'lr i n ' - "' " \ lulaies i h b SCUUKI aspect ol lint \ agueness 
doctrine. Morales, 527 U.S. at 61 (citations omitted). Likewise, a child endangerment 
statute that allows prosecution when there "may" be a possibility of risk of physical or 
moral harm to a child violates this second aspect of the vagueness doctrine since it allows 
law enforcement to decide what conduct may create the possibility of a risk of harm. 
Carter, 462 S.E.2d at 585. 
The child endangerment statute at issue in Carter was vague because it failed to 
establish minimal guidelines for law enforcement, thereby leaving it to law enforcement 
to decide what conduct constituted child endangerment. Id. The language of the statute, 
which prohibited placing a child in a situation that "may" cause moral or physical harm, 
left law enforcement to decide, "guided by subjectivity and personal predilection," the 
conduct which falls within the statute. Id. 
By using the term "may," the legislature criminalizes any act which 
presents a "possibility" of physical or moral harm to a child. [ ]. 
Thus, guided by subjectivity and personal predilection, police and 
prosecutors in this instance concluded that the factually diverse conduct of 
each defendant possibly endangered the life, health, or morals of minors 
then in their custody. This determination may have resulted from 
individual moral imperatives, unique perspectives on specific conduct, or 
defendants' mere status. [ ] Whatever the motivation and however well-
intentioned, the vague and inclusive language clearly failed to adequately 
inform law enforcement of the precise conduct prohibited by Code § 40.1-
103, thereby accommodating arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
Id. (citations and footnote omitted); see also Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 123 ("It cannot be 
left to juries, judges, and prosecutors" to decide how to apply a statute.). 
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Accordingly; when a statute fails to give notice as to the conduct it proscribes or 
due process. Under such circumstances, due process requires that the statute be stricken. 
See Morales, 527 U.S. at 56 ("[vjagueness may invalidate a law" either because the 
statute iviiis 10 give notice or because it does not establish minimal guidelines ;^r 
e • • ' i " , n t ) . 
B. UTAH'S CHILD ENDANGERMENT STATUTE ALLOWS 
EXPANSIVE PROSECUTION WITHOUT DEFINING "EXPOSED TO" 
AND WITHOUT CLARIFYING WHETHER DANGER OR A 
STGN1FF \N ! RISK OF APPRECIABLE HARM IS REQUIRED. 
I i « : I "N 11 II I I ' l l !> I I i l l I V [ P I U N il 11 1 1 III , i 11 L» I I l " I " 1 C " i 1 1 i >' V ill II II I I "L 
in that it fails to provide suiiieient detail to give notice to a person of ordinary 
intelligence' as to what conduct is prohibited by the statute and also foils to provide 
minimal guidelines for law enforcement, thereby allowing for arbitrary and 
discriminatory ei lforcei I lent 1 1 le child endangern lei it stati ite I Jtal i Cocl = ""'!| i n I 
§76-5-112.5 (2003), states: 
76-5-112.5 Fuelangerment of a child or elder 
For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Chemical substance" means a substance intent - ...» De 
usca as a precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or 
any other chemical intended to be used in the manufacture of a 
controlled substance. Intent under this subsection may be 
demonstrated by the substance's use. quantity, manner of storage, or 
proximin to other precursors, or to manufacturing equipment. 
• j "Child" means the same as that term is defined in 
Subsection "^-^ W)<)(! u !* 
(c) "Controlled substance" means the same as that term is 
defined in Section 58-37-2. 
(d) "Drug paraphernalia" means the same as that term is 
defined in Section 58-37a-3. 
(e) "Elder adulf' means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 76-5-111. 
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person 
who knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be 
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled 
substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in 
Subsection (1), is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(3) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person 
who violates Subsection (2), and a child or elder adult actually suffers 
bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure 
to, ingestion of, inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, 
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia is guilty of a second degree 
felony unless the exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in the 
death of the child or elder adult, in which case the person is guilty of a 
felony of the first degree. 
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this section 
that the controlled substance was provided by lawful prescription for 
the child or elder adult, and that it was administered to the child or 
elder adult in accordance with the prescription instructions provided 
with the controlled substance. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (4), "prescription" has the same 
definition as in Section 58-37-2. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2003). 
In interpreting a statute, courts first consider the plain language of a statute. 
Travelers/Aetna Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 2002 UT App 221, f 12, 51 P.3d 1288. When 
considering the plain language of a statute, courts "presume that the legislature used each 
word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning." Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Svs.. Inc., 2001 UT 29, TJ12, 24 P.3d 928 
(citations omitted). Courts "'read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and 
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interpre. IL-, pi-. . .;-. ;:•, :u larmony \ ;::. ,j.cr statutes in the same chapter and related 
chanter "m Stale \ . Irclanu < * i- Miller \ . \\ ca\ei. , 
]^ 17, 60 P.3d 592,. .. _. Js in a statute that have a commonly accepted meaning should be 
given that common, lay meaning unless there is an indication that the legislature intended 
c
ii
 •."" « • UIXLICUVAetna Ins. l u . . 
When the language of the statute is not clear, courts look bc> ond the lanmiaLH * 
statute and utilize other methods of statutory construction. The focus in analyzing the 
statute remains, however, on ellectuating the legislative intent. Where possible, a stallite 
nil ist be ^ sonsti i i z d sc as to a ' oid "constiti itic i lal infirmities " Intermoununn .Smii > .K,H \. 
Labor Comm'n., 2002 UT App 164,1f6, 48 P.3d 252 (tiling In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 
2000 UT 28, f23, 1 P.3d 1074 (citations and quotations omitted)). 
In construing a statute, our aim is to give effect to the legislature's intent in 
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. When doubt or 
uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's provision „„ 
analysis of the act in its entirety should be undertaken and its provisions 
harmonized in accordance with legislative intent and purpose. ()ne of the 
cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the courts \\ ill look t< > the 
reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context 
and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject, further, we ha\ e 
a diity to construe a statute whenever possible so as to effectuate the 
.1'iiiv,* mi.Mit and avoid and/or save it fr^ ™ '^'^titutional confli' • •" 
i l l 1 II l i i l l l C b . 
Id. Moreover, while the title of a statute is ordinarily not considered part of its text, wi len 
the language of the statute is ambiguous, courts will consider the title in construing a 
•aalUiL 1 ^tatCOt Stephen:^ \ . D U I H I L - M I H : i i d x u i n u " i > i 
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The language of Utah's child endangerment statute allows prosecution for 
exposure to controlled or chemical substances or paraphernalia without clarifying the 
meaning of "exposed to" and without requiring danger or a significant risk of harm. The 
meaning of the term "exposed to" is ambiguous in that it is not clear whether the child 
must have direct contact with or a connection to the contraband or whether just seeing the 
item is enough, and it is also not clear whether any actual danger or significant risk of 
harm is required in order to be "exposed to" contraband within the meaning of the statute. 
Because the language is ambiguous, legislative history and the title of the statute can be 
considered in determining the reach of the statute. See id. 
Legislative history demonstrates that the legislature did not intend for the statute to 
be broadly applied to circumstances such as these where parents have marijuana and 
paraphernalia out of reach in their home where an infant resides, or when a mother breast 
feeds her baby at some point after using marijuana. Instead, the legislative history of the 
child endangerment statute demonstrates that the legislature intended to reach behavior 
that caused direct contact or connection between children or the elderly and controlled 
substances, chemical substances or paraphernalia, and which raised "significant risks of 
injury or even potential death to child, or to the elderly." Senate Bill 188, House Debates 
(February 29, 2000); see legislative history at R. 88-102 in Addendum D. 
In passing the legislation in 2000, both houses focused on the danger to children 
and the elderly that arises when a person is operating a clandestine lab and producing 
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meinarnpneiamme in a nonu \MKTC uiiiJi^.i 01 me eldeii} ICSKIC. Senate Bill ,^\ Senate 
D^bnn^ f]-c^ri ,.- ,: M I ...-, M:-i *, -ih.iii stx '* * • •» 
fact, the discussion in the House focused on methamphetamine labs, and in summation, 
Representative Cox reiterated that "[l]aw enforcement has been working very hard to 
CK-(! . . •- . _:..:»ngerment statute provL. . ; 
them a better tool iu u - ! .*- ^ ' r n f / hi --• i k r " ; '.:-L\ 
children and the elderly caused by the production oi meiiuniphetamine in their homes. 
R. 96. Legislative history therefore demonstrates that in passing the child endangerment 
statute ii 1 2000 tl ic legislate n e intended tl le statute to be applie d ^ > 1 lei i < c i a 
significant risk of harm is created by intentionally or knowingly permitting a child to have 
contact with or k- impacted by a controlled or chemical substance or paraphernalia. See 
I Jtah Code Ann. £ i.-.>- < • _..-* (20UU i m .Addendum E. 
T h e leg* . •* 
intended to change the reach of the statute so as to allow prosecution when there was not 
danger or a substantial risk of harm, and instead were aimed at correcting two 
"oversights in , , ...*•.;*) statute. Although ,uc JOU„ amendments removed the 
elder adult to be at risk of suffering bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious 
bodily injury" that change was not intended to broaden the reach of the statute and instead 
•.j> .;.. . ...
 r . . . .. .. \ >,LICIHI1IL c \ k i e n c e t o e s t a k . ,. : . .L d a n g e r o f 
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controlled substances. House Bill 125, House Debates (February 25, 2002); Senate 
Debates (March 5, 2002); R. 95, 99 in Addendum D. In addition, the legislature added an 
exception for prescription medication in 2002. Hence, the legislative intent in adopting 
and amending the child endangerment statute was to criminalize conduct that created 
danger or a significant risk of harm. 
The title of the statute also demonstrates that the legislature intended that it 
proscribe conduct that endangers children or that causes a substantial risk of 
endangerment. While ingestion or inhalation of a controlled substance by a child may 
demonstrate a substantial risk of harm, without more, being "exposed to" a controlled or 
chemical substance or paraphernalia, when broadly defined, does not. In fact, in this case 
where the marijuana and paraphernalia were in the basement and Ms. Draper breast fed 
her baby at some point after using an unspecified amount of marijuana, a substantial risk 
of appreciable harm to the child did not exist. 
Although the legislature focused primarily on clandestine methamphetamine 
production and the serious risks to children when methamphetamine is produced in their 
home, the statute contains far broader language that renders it unconstitutional. 
By not requiring any danger or a substantial risk of harm and by not defining the term 
"exposed to," the child endangerment statute violates due process. While statutes are 
presumed to be constitutional, when a statute as applied to a defendant such as Ms. Draper 
fails to give notice or allows for arbitrary enforcement, that statute must be invalidated as 
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a violation of due process. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 56. 
C. UTAH'S CHILD ENDANGERMENT STATUTE IS VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS BECAUSE IT FAILS TO GIVE NOTICE AS TO 
CONDUCT PROHIBITED UNDER THE STATUTE. 
Utah's child endangerment statute fails to give notice to a person of ordinary 
intelligence regarding the nature of the conduct that is prohibited. As applied to the facts 
of this case, the statute fails to give notice that having marijuana and paraphernalia out of 
reach in a house where an infant lives would give rise to prosecution for child 
endangerment, or that nursing a child at some point after using an unspecified amount of 
marijuana would give rise to a charge. The failure of the statute to specify the limitations 
of the term "exposed to" and the ambiguity of that term in the context of the statute, along 
with the statute's failure to require danger or a significant risk of harm, demonstrates the 
lack of notice inherent in the statute. Because the statute fails to give the required notice, 
it is void for vagueness in violation of due process. 
The term "exposed to" is not defined in the statute and provides unclear direction 
as to the behavior that might "expose" a child to a controlled substance, chemical 
substance or paraphernalia. While the statute makes it unlawful to intentionally allow a 
child to be exposed to a controlled substance or paraphernalia, it does not specify whether 
being "exposed to" requires some direct contact or whether being in the vicinity of the 
contraband without any connection is sufficient. Nor does the term "exposed to" specify 
whether the exposure must create danger or a significant risk of harm to the child. 
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The trial court relied on the following definition of the word "expose" found in 
Random House Webster's Dictionary in reaching its conclusion the word "expose" as 
used in the statute includes visual exposure of contraband to children. R. 122. 
La. To remove shelter or protection from; b. To lay open, as to something 
undesirable or injurious. 2. To subject (e.g., a photographic film) to the 
action of light. 3. To make visible . . . 4.a. To make known (e.g., a crime); 
b. To reveal the guilt or wrongdoing of. 5. To abandon or put out without 
shelter or food. 
R. 122, citing Random House Webster's Dictionary 250 (4th ed. 2001). Other dictionaries 
likewise contain multiple definitions for the word "expose." For example, Webster's 
New World Dictionary defines the word "expose" as follows: 
la) to lay open (to danger, attack, ridicule, etc.); leave unprotected b) to 
make accessible or subject (to an influence or action) 2 to put or leave out in 
an unprotected place, abandon [some ancient peoples exposed unwanted 
infants] 3 to allow to be seen; disclose; reveal; exhibit; display 4 a) to make 
(a crime, fraud, etc.) known; unmask b) to make known the crimes, etc. of 5 
Photog. To subject (a sensitized film or plate) to radiation having a 
photochemical effect. 
Webster's New World Dictionary, 4th ed. 501 (4th ed. 2003). These multiple definitions 
demonstrate that the word "expose" has many different meanings and applications and 
that the word does not have a commonly understood and accepted meaning because of the 
nuances in the use of the word. The trial court's conclusion that this term applied in its 
commonly understood meaning in the context of this statute was incorrect in light of these 
multiple definitions and the nuances in the use of the term. 
The use of the word in the context of the statute raises additional ambiguities. The 
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statute requires that an adult allow a child "to be exposed to" a substance or 
paraphernalia; in other words, the language of the statute requires exposure of the child to 
the substance or paraphernalia and not that the substance or paraphernalia be exposed to 
the child. That wording suggests that the first definition of expose found in Webster's 
Dictionary, "to lay open (to danger, attack ridicule, etc.); leave unprotected or to make 
accessible or subject (to an influence or action)" is the definition applicable to the child 
endangerment statute. Pursuant to that definition, a child who is laid open to or subjected 
to danger from a controlled substance or paraphernalia has been "exposed to" an item 
within the meaning of the statute. 
The use of the word "exposure" in subsection (3) is consistent with this definition 
and further demonstrates that the statute outlaws exposure of the child to the contraband 
and not the other way around. Subsection (3) enhances the penalty for violation of the 
statute when "a child . . . actually suffers bodily injury . . . by exposure to . . . a controlled 
substance . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(3). 
The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the child endangerment statute, 
concluding that the statute provided notice that having drugs in the basement constituted 
exposure under the statute and also that the statute gave notice that nursing a child after 
using marijuana allowed a child to be exposed to or to ingest marijuana, in violation of 
the statute. R. 165-66. Rather than considering the context in which the term "exposed 
to" is used in the statute, the trial court broadly defined the word "expose" as to "to lay 
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open"or "make visible," and concluded that since the contraband was visible and the 
infant was not protected from the items, "the child was exposed to them." R. 165. 
The trial court's conclusion that the words "exposed to" encompass any items that 
are visible or in plain view to children emphasizes the ambiguity of the word as used in 
this statute. R. 122, 124. According to the trial court, any time contraband is in plain 
view, regardless of whether the child sees the item, the child is exposed to the item. 
R. 165. Even if there is no possibility of danger to the child, the adult can be prosecuted 
for allowing the contraband to be in plain view, according to the definition of "exposure" 
employed by the trial court. Allowing a child to be in the room when a television 
program depicts an actor using drugs, allowing a child to walk by a shop where a pipe is 
displayed in the window, or taking a child to a park where people are smoking marijuana 
would all amount to child endangerment under the trial court's definition of "exposure," 
regardless of whether the child saw the contraband or faced any danger. 
In addition to the trial court's expansive reading of the statute to include visibility 
of the contraband, the broad dictionary definitions demonstrate that almost any action of 
permitting a child to be near a controlled or chemical substance or paraphernalia could 
arguably amount to exposure under the statute. For example, has a parent permitted a 
child to be exposed to paraphernalia if he takes the child into a store where cigarette 
rolling papers are sold? Under the broad dictionary definition of the word "expose," a 
child would be subjected to paraphernalia under these circumstances. Or, what if a parent 
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talks about a controlled substance or paraphernalia in front of a child? Discussing 
controlled substances in front of a child arguably subjects or exposes that child to a 
controlled substance. Moreover, since the statute outlaws exposure to chemical 
substances, under the trial court's interpretation and the broad definitions for "expose," 
strong cleaning products or paint thinner in a house could result in prosecution under this 
statute simply because the child was near the products.2 
The statute fails to give fair notice of the conduct that it proscribes not only 
because the words "expose to" encompass a broad spectrum of actions, but also because 
the statute does not contain any language that limits the application of the statute to 
circumstances where the "exposure" or "ingestion" creates actual danger or at least a 
significant risk of harm to the child. See Downey, 476 N.E 2d at 123. In fact, the 
language of the statute is so broad that it does not require any connection between the 
child and the contraband and does not require any significant potential for harm. 
Accordingly, Utah's child endangerment statute did not provide fair notice to Ms. Draper 
that marijuana and paraphernalia in plain view in the basement or nursing her infant 
would subject her to prosecution for endangering that child. 
2
 The child endangerment statute defines "chemical substance" as "a precursor in 
the manufacture of controlled substance"; intent is demonstrated by the "substance's use, 
quantity, manner of storage, or proximity to other precursors or to manufacturing 
equipment." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(l)(a) (2002). Under this definition, Drano 
stored in the same cupboard as a glass container or iodine, otherwise innocent behavior, 
could be prosecuted as child endangerment under the statute. 
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Like the loitering statute in Morales, Utah's child endangerment statute fails to 
give fair notice as to what acts it prohibits. In Morales, the Court concluded that the 
Illinois loitering statute did not give fair notice as to what loitering conduct was 
prohibited. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 57-60. Similarly, Utah's child endangerment statute 
fails the notice inquiry since it does not give notice to parents or others who are in the 
vicinity of children as to what acts in connection with controlled or chemical substances 
or paraphernalia will give rise to prosecution as child endangerment. In the context of 
this case, Utah's child endangerment statute failed to give notice that marijuana and 
paraphernalia in the basement of a home where an infant resides or nursing a child would 
give rise to a prosecution for child endangerment. Like the unconstitutional loitering 
statute in Morales, Utah's child endangerment statute violates the first aspect of the 
vagueness test because it does not provide a standard of conduct to which persons can 
conform their behavior in order to not be prosecuted for child endangerment. See id. 
The Constitution does not permit a legislature to "set a net large enough to 
catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say 
who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large." United 
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 23 L.Ed. 563 (1876). This ordinance is 
therefore vague "not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his 
conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather 
in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Coates v. 
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 29 L.Ed.2d 214, 91 S.Ct. 1686(1971). 
Morales, 527 U.S. at 60. 
The decision in Downey, holding that the Indiana child endangerment statute failed 
to provide adequate notice as to what conduct it prohibited, further demonstrates that 
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Utah's child endangerment statute fails the first prong of the vagueness inquiry. See 
Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 123. The statute in Downey made it unlawful to place a 
dependent "in a situation that may endanger his life or health." Id, The court read the 
statute as "proscribing] placements which to some degree are likely to bring a dependent 
into a situation in which he is exposed to harm." Id. Because the statute did not require 
that the conduct give rise to "a danger which is actual and appreciable," the court 
concluded that it left persons to guess as to what conduct "may" endanger a child, thereby 
violating due process. Id Like the child endangerment statute at issue in Downey, the 
language of Utah's child endangerment statute is so broad that it does not require a 
substantial likelihood of harm to the child or contact between the child and the chemical 
or controlled substance or paraphernalia and does not therefore "indicate where the line is 
to be drawn between trivial and substantial things so that erratic arrests and convictions 
for trivial acts and omissions will not occur." Id 
Child endangerment statutes in other jurisdictions that have at least tied the 
defendant's actions to the creation of a possibility of risk of harm have nevertheless been 
considered unconstitutionally vague because "persons of common intelligence are left to 
guess about the statute's meaning." Id. By not requiring danger or even the possibility of 
harm to the child, Utah's statute fails to specify what type of impact or potential impact, if 
any, the controlled substances, chemical substances or paraphernalia must have on the 
child, and therefore offers even less clarity than the statute in Downey. This lack of 
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clarity is exacerbated by the inclusion of the broad term "exposed to." Accordingly, the 
statute failed to give Ms. Draper notice that drugs and paraphernalia in plain view in her 
basement would subject her to a child endangerment charge or that nursing her child at 
some point after using an unspecified amount of marijuana would subject her to 
prosecution for child endangerment in the absence of a showing that her child was 
endangered. 
D. UTAH'S CHILD ENDANGERMENT STATUTE IS ALSO VOID 
FOR VAGUENESS BECAUSE IT FAILS TO ESTABLISH MINIMAL 
GUIDELINES AND IS THEREFORE SUBJECT TO ARBITRARY AND 
DISCRIMINATORY APPLICATION. 
Additionally, even if Utah's child endangerment statute informed a person of 
ordinary intelligence that marijuana in the basement or nursing a child under the 
circumstances of this case could be prosecuted as child endangerment, the statute 
nevertheless is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to establish minimal guidelines 
and is subject to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 61. 
Just as the loitering statute in Morales '"provides absolute discretion to police officers to 
determine what activities constitute loitering,'" Utah's child endangerment statute leaves 
absolute discretion to police officers to determine what constitutes permitting a child "to 
be exposed to" controlled or chemical substances or paraphernalia and also complete 
discretion to determine whether actual danger is required. See id (citations omitted). 
The broad definition of the term "exposed to" and the failure of the statute to 
require that the child be exposed to danger or a serious risk of appreciable harm leaves the 
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enforcement of the statute to the "subjectivity and personal predilection" of officers, 
prosecutors, judges, and juries. See Carter, 462 S.E.2d at 585. As previously outlined, 
the term "exposed to" has multiple meanings which render the statute ambiguous, thereby 
allowing officers rather than the legislature to decide what actions amount to child 
endangerment under the statute. Moreover, since the statute does not require that a child 
be subjected to danger, officers, prosecutors, judges, and juries are left to decide whether 
a particular action amounts to exposure under the statute. 
The decision in Carter, concluding that the child endangerment statute at issue in 
that case allowed arbitrary government action in violation of the second aspect of the 
vagueness doctrine, highlights the problems with Utah's statute. See Carter, 462 S.E.2d 
at 585. The child endangerment statute in Carter violated the second aspect of the 
vagueness doctrine because it allowed prosecution based on the possibility that the 
defendant's conduct may threaten the health or morals of a child. IcL This imprecise 
standard left the decision as to what conduct fit within the statute to the "subjectivity and 
personal predilection" of police and prosecutors who, based on "individual moral 
imperatives, unique perspectives on specific conduct, or defendants' mere status" (id.), 
could decide if the defendant's conduct fit within the child endangerment statute. The 
problem with this is that "[wjhatever the motivation and however well-intentioned," such 
an approach "'necessarily entrusts lawmaking to the moment to moment judgment of the 
policeman on his beat,'" resulting in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Morales, 
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527 U.S. at 60 (quoting Kolender. 461 U.S. at 359); see also Carter. 462 S.E.2d at 585; 
Downey. 476 N.E.2d at 123. 
Similarly, Utah's child endangerment statute leaves the determination as to what 
conduct constitutes permitting a child "to be exposed to" controlled substances, chemical 
substances or paraphernalia, as well as the determination of whether an actual danger is 
required to the discretion of officers and prosecutors. While many officers or prosecutors 
might have concluded marijuana in a basement or nursing an infant when there was no 
showing that the child was endangered would not give rise to child endangerment 
charges, the prosecutor in this case decided otherwise. The arbitrariness of charging child 
endangerment in this case is emphasized by the fact that the child was an infant and there 
was no evidence he had seen the items and the fact that there was no showing the child 
would ingest or be exposed to marijuana through nursing. 
Utah's child endangerment statute also leaves to police and prosecutors the 
determination of whether danger or potential harm is required and, if so, what constitutes 
such danger or potential harm. While many police officers would require a closer nexus 
between the conduct and the impact on the children, whether that be actual harm or a 
substantial likelihood of appreciable harm, than that which occurred in this case, the 
statute fails to specify minimal requirements in this area. This failure of the statute to 
specify the nature of the danger or connection required between the contraband and the 
child further demonstrates the broad sweep of the statute and its susceptibility to arbitrary 
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and discriminatory enforcement. Utah's statute allows an even broader application than 
the unconstitutional child endangerment statute at issue in Carter since the Carter statute 
required that the proscribed conduct at least create possible harm to the child. See Carter, 
462S.E.2dat585. 
The trial court's decision in this case likewise emphasizes the standardless sweep 
of Utah's child endangerment statute and the concomitant arbitrariness of its application. 
The trial court recognized that the statute "reaches a broad spectrum of conduct to allow 
the fact finder to determine under the specific facts of the case whether a child or elder 
were 'exposed' to 'a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia.'" 
R. 165. Contrary to the trial court's resolution, the broad, undefined sweep of the statute 
renders the statute unconstitutional precisely because it allows policemen, prosecutors, 
judges, and juries to decide what conduct constitutes exposure. Because Utah's child 
endangerment statute fails to establish minimal guidelines and entrusts lawmaking to 
officers and prosecutors, it fails the second prong of the vagueness doctrine and must be 
overturned as a violation of due process. 
E. THE VAGUENESS OF UTAH'S CHILD ENDANGERMENT 
STATUTE REQUIRES THAT IT BE INVALIDATED. 
When a statute is unconstitutionally vague and is "'not reasonably susceptible to a 
limiting construction,'" the statute must be invalidated. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 51 
(citation omitted); see also In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 110, |25, 61 P.3d 1038 (invalidating 
statute based on its overbreadth where statute could not reasonably be construed to meet 
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due process requirements). While courts construe a statute in order "to 'effectuate the 
legislative intent' while avoiding interpretations that conflict with relevant constitutional 
mandates," fin re Matter of a Criminal Investigation. 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988)), in 
doing so, a court cannot rewrite the statute. In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 110, ]f25. In 
attempting to construe a statute so as to meet constitutional requirements, courts are 
nevertheless limited "by reasonable canons of statutory construction." IdL A court cannot 
"'infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation 
must be based on the language used, and [the court has] no power to rewrite the statute to 
conform to an intention not expressed."5 Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, "[i]n 
considering the ordinary meaning of the terms of a statute, [courts] will not interpret the 
language so that it results in an application that is 'unreasonably confused, inoperable, 
[or] in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.5" Id. (citations omitted). 
The vagueness of the child endangerment statute requires that it be invalidated 
since in order to construe the statute to meet constitutional requirements, this Court would 
have to rewrite the statute and such an interpretation would render the statute confusing 
and inoperable. Because the statute cannot be reasonably construed so as to give notice as 
to what is prohibited and to preclude arbitrary enforcement while also effectuating the 
legislative intent, it must be stricken.3 
3
 A facial challenge based on the statute's vagueness exists "if the statute is shown 
to be vague in all of its applications, beginning with its application to the facts at hand." 
Green, 2004 UT 76,1J45 n.15, citing State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, TJ12, 84 P.3d 1171. 
32 
F. ALTERNATIVELY, IF THIS COURT ATTEMPTS TO SAVE THE 
STATUTE FROM ITS CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES, THE 
INTERPRETATION MUST NARROW THE APPLICATION TO 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE DIRECT CONTACT OR CONNECTION 
BETWEEN THE CHILD AND THE CONTRABAND CREATES 
ACTUAL DANGER OR A SIGNIFICANT RISK OF HARM. 
Although Appellant believes that the statute cannot be construed so as to save it 
from its constitutional infirmities, if this Court believes otherwise, to meet due process 
concerns, at the very least the words "exposed to" must be stricken or defined narrowly, 
and the statute as a whole must be read to require danger or a significant risk of harm to a 
child. Construed in this manner, the statute would retain some "residual vagueness" but 
would be closer to the type of statute mandated by due process. See Downey, 476 N.E.2d 
at 123 (recognizing that "residual vagueness" remained despite narrow construction of 
statute, but concluding that due process requirements were met under narrowed 
construction in light of concern for health and welfare of children). 
First, the words "exposed to" must either be stricken because of the wide range of 
definitions available for that term, or narrowly limited to circumstances where there is 
contact between the child and controlled substance or the controlled substance has some 
physical impact on the child, and the contact or impact creates actual danger or a 
significant risk of danger to the child. See id. The term "exposed to" is found in a list of 
In this case where Utah's child endangerment statute is vague as applied, it is also vague 
on its face since it is unclear whether it requires actual danger and the words "exposed 
to" have limitless application. 
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actions that include "to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-112.5(2). It must therefore be read narrowly and in harmony with these 
surrounding terms. See Ireland, 2005 Ut App 22 at %l1 (reading word "consumption" 
narrowly and in harmony with surrounding terms). The terms surrounding "exposed to" 
require a more significant impact than merely being in the vicinity of an item or seeing it. 
Instead, there must be an actual touching or entry into the body. The trial court's 
conclusion that contraband in plain view or nursing exposed the Draper infant to the 
contraband was therefore incorrect since the term "exposed to" must be interpreted in 
harmony with the surrounding terms. See id. 
In addition, the title of the statute supports an interpretation requiring danger. 
Because the language of the statute is ambiguous, consideration of the title is appropriate. 
See Estate of Stephens, 935 P.2d at 521-22. The title of the statute, "Endangerment of a 
child or elder adult" demonstrates that the statute is aimed at circumstances where a child 
is actually endangered by the conduct. 
Moreover, the legislative intent supports a narrow interpretation of the words 
"exposed to" and application of the statute only where the conduct creates actual danger 
or a significant risk of actual and appreciable harm. As set forth supra at 18-20, the 
legislature passed this statute to address the "significant risks of injury or even potential 
death to child, or to the elderly" that arise when a person is operating a clandestine drug 
lab around children or the elderly. R. 86, 96; see Addendum D. Although the statute was 
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amended in 2002 to limit the need for scientific evidence, the legislative intent to 
proscribe conduct that endangers children remained. Hence, legislative intent and the title 
of the statute support construing the words "exposed to" narrowly and requiring danger 
for the statute to apply. 
The decision in Downey construing Indiana's child endangerment statute narrowly 
in order to save it from its constitutional infirmities provides guidance. Although the 
statute violated due process when construed literally because it subjected persons to 
prosecution based on the mere possibility that an action may endanger a child, the court 
concluded that a non-literal and narrow construction of the possibility of harm language 
could save the statute. Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 122-23. The court recognized that it could 
not "amend a statute or establish public policy within its judicial authority to confine 
legislative products to constitutional limits." Id. at 123. It could, however, "in reading a 
statute for constitutional testing, [ ] give it a narrowing construction to save it from 
nullification, where such construction does not establish a new or different policy basis 
and is consistent with legislative intent." Id. (citation omitted). 
With those guidelines in mind, the Downey court construed Indiana's child 
endangerment statute as "as applying to situations that endanger the life or health of a 
dependent." Id. The court clarified that "[t]he placement must itself expose the 
dependent to danger which is actual and appreciable." Id While acknowledging that this 
narrower construction of the statute had "residual vagueness," the court was willing to 
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accept that residual vagueness in light societal concerns regarding the health and safety of 
children. Id; see also Carter, 462 S.E.2d at 585 (severing portion of child endangerment 
statute that was unconstitutionally vague because it allowed prosecution for the mere 
possibility of danger, and leaving remainder of statute in place). 
Should this Court conclude that Utah's child endangerment statute can be 
construed to save it from constitutional infirmities, this Court should at the very least 
strike the term "exposed to" or narrowly construe that term and require that a person must 
permit a direct connection or contact between the child and contraband which creates 
actual danger or a significant risk of harm in order to be prosecuted for child 
endangerment. 
POINT II. THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE 
TO SUPPORT A BINDOVER ON THE CHILD ENDANGERMENT 
CHARGE WHERE THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THE INFANT INGESTED OR WAS 
EXPOSED TO MARIJUANA SO AS TO ENDANGER HIM. 
The child endangerment charges should be dismissed not only because the statute 
is void for vagueness in violation of due process, but also because the state failed to 
establish probable cause to believe that Ms. Draper committed the crime of child 
endangerment. Regardless of whether the statute is given a broad interpretation or this 
Court attempts to narrow the statute in an effort to save it from its constitutional 
infirmities, the state failed to establish probable cause to believe Ms. Draper committed 
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the crime of child endangerment. Although the standard for bindover is low, the trial 
court erred in refusing to quash the bindover in this case. 
A. EVEN IF THE STATUTE IS GIVEN UNLIMITED APPLICATION, 
THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
BELIEVE THAT MS. DRAPER INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY 
ALLOWED HER INFANT TO BE EXPOSED TO OR INGEST 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. 
Even if the term "exposed to" is given a broad definition, the state did not establish 
probable cause to believe that Ms. Draper intentionally or knowingly allowed her infant 
"to be exposed to" or ingest marijuana. While the magistrate concluded that the state 
failed to demonstrate probable cause to believe the baby was exposed to the marijuana in 
the basement, he concluded that probable cause for the bindover existed based on nursing 
the child. R. 66. Although in addressing the vagueness issue, the trial court referred to 
the child endangerment theory based on drugs being in plain view in the basement, it 
upheld the bindover based only on the nursing evidence. R. 165, 168. Because the state 
failed to establish probable cause to bind over Ms. Draper for trial based on its theory that 
by nursing her child, Ms. Draper allowed the child "to be exposed to" or "to ingest" 
marijuana, the bindover should be quashed. 
"'[T]o bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show "probable cause" at a 
preliminary hearing by producing' evidence sufficient 'to support a reasonable belief that 
an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.5" State v. Bradshaw, 
2004 UT App 298, f23, 99 P.3d 359 (cert granted) (quoting Clark, 2001 UT 9, ffiflO, 16 
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(citations omitted)). "This means that the State must produce 'believable evidence of all 
the elements of the crime charged.'" Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298 at |^23 (quoting Clark, 
2001 UT 9 at *|J15). The probable cause standard at preliminary hearings is the same as 
the probable cause standard for arrest warrants. Clark, 2001 UT 9 at TJ16. Moreover, the 
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing must be viewed in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution for purposes of bindover. State v. Virgin, 2004 UT App 251, [^1 1, 96 
P.3d 379 (further citations omitted). 
Although the magistrate cannot assess the credibility of the witnesses, a magistrate 
can and should "disregard [ ] facially incredible evidence." State v. Talbot 972 P.2d 435, 
438 (Utah 1998). In fact, disregarding incredible evidence is necessary if a preliminary 
hearing is to serve the purpose of "'ferreting out groundless and improvident 
prosecutions.'" L i , citing State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980). In this 
case, the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the state failed to establish 
probable cause to believe Ms. Draper committed the crime of child endangerment. 
The marshaled evidence is as follows4: 
1. Ms. Draper lived with her husband, another adult, and four-month-old son, 
D.D. R. 46, 52, 55, 57. D.D. was born on September 8, 2003. R. 57. 
4
 Although marshaling is not required since the magistrate did not make any 
findings as to demeanor or credibility of the witnesses and this Court "review[s] the 
magistrate's decision to bind over a defendant without deference," Ms. Draper 
nevertheless marshals the evidence for the convenience of the Court. See Virgin, 2004 
UTApp251,H9,n.2. 
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2. Officers executed a search warrant on the home on January 9, 2004. R. 46. 
During the search, they found individually packaged marijuana, baggies, scales, money, a 
pay-owe sheet, a couple of bongs, and some pipes in a downstairs room. R. 48. Although 
the trial court determined that these items "lay open or were visible and the child was not 
protected from them," the state did not put on any evidence that the items were in plain 
view. R. 48; see also R. 44-62. 
3. The marijuana and paraphernalia found downstairs belonged to Ms. Draper's 
husband, Jimmie Draper. R. 49-50, 52. Two bags tested positive for marijuana; one bag 
had 9.9 grams while the other bag had 8.7 grams. R. 50-51. Officers also found money in 
the bedroom Ms. Draper shared with her husband. R. 49. 
4. After being Mirandized, Ms. Draper acknowledged that her husband had been 
selling marijuana for 1 lA years. R. 49. She also told the officer that her husband left the 
house to make his sales and nothing was sold out of the house. R. 54. 
5. Ms. Draper and her husband shared an upstairs bedroom. R. 53. Four-month-
old D.D. had an upstairs bedroom. R. 53. 
6. On January 20, 2004, an investigator with the Division of Child and Family 
Services, made an unannounced visit to Ms. Draper's home. R. 57. D.D. was present 
during the interview. R. 57. The purpose of the interview was to discuss allegations of 
child endangerment based on police finding marijuana in the home. R. 57. 
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7. During the January 20, 2004 visit, the investigator asked Ms. Draper whether 
she was "using or currently using" marijuana. R. 58. Ms. Draper told the investigator 
that she had used marijuana twice since D.D. was born, once on New Year's Eve and 
once on January 9, 2004 after the officers executed the warrant on her home. R. 58. 
8. While the investigator was talking with Ms. Draper, Appellant began nursing 
D.D. R. 58. The investigator then talked to Ms. Draper "about the dangers of using and 
how marijuana and any other drugs go through breast milk to the child." R. 58. 
Ms. Draper told the investigator "that she did not know that the marijuana would go 
through the breast milk to the child" and that she would not use again. R. 60. 
The magistrate concluded that the evidence supported bindover on the nursing 
theory of child endangerment based on his incorrect perception that the evidence showed 
that Ms. Draper stated that she nursed her child in close proximity to her use of marijuana. 
The magistrate stated: 
Now, I have evidence at this point that breast feeding will transmit the 
Marijuana, some substance from Marijuana through breast milk to the child 
if it is smoked. That is the evidence. I have evidence from Ms. Draper's 
statement that she smoked and then transmitted it to the child and I have her 
statement that she didn't know that, which may be true or maybe not, but it 
is certainly a self-serving statement under these circumstances. I am bound 
to interpret everything in favor of the State here to find all inferences in 
favor of the State and to assume that the State's case will get stronger. Now 
I don't know whether it will or not in this case and I will tell you this, it is a 
very shaky jury case at this point. 
R. 66. The trial court on the other hand apparently focused on the January 20th nursing 
incident and upheld the bindover by speculating that since Ms. Draper nursed her infant 
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and Was an admitted drug user, she must have used drugs prior to nursing. R. 168. The 
judge stated: 
As stated above, supra I.A., the Defendant was nursing her child and was an 
admitted drug user. A reasonable inference that the Defendant was using 
drugs prior to nursing her child can be made, therefore the "ingested" 
portion of the statute may apply. Although there was testimony that the 
Defendant did not know that the drugs in her system and would pass to her 
child when she was nursing, the evidence must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State and all reasonable inferences drawn in the State's 
favor. The Court concludes that there was enough evidence at the 
preliminary hearing to show the Defendant knowingly or intentionally 
caused her child to ingest or be exposed to a controlled substance, chemical 
substance or drug paraphernalia. 
R. 168. 
In order to bind over a defendant for trial on the charge of child endangerment, the 
state must present credible evidence establishing probable cause as to all elements of the 
crime. In other words, the state must establish through credible evidence probable cause 
to believe that Ms. Draper "knowingly or intentionally cause[d] or permitted] a child . . . 
to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, 
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia... ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). In 
this case where the Information alleges that the crime of child endangerment occurred on 
or about January 9, 2004, the state failed to establish probable cause to believe that on or 
about January 9, 2004, Ms. Draper nursed her child after consuming marijuana, and that 
the marijuana was transmitted to the child thereby causing the child to ingest or be 
exposed to the marijuana. Moreover, if this Court concludes that the child endangerment 
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statute requires danger or a significant risk of harm to the child, the state also failed to 
establish this element where there is not credible evidence showing that even if marijuana 
is transmitted in breast milk, it will endanger a child. 
While the evidence shows that Ms. Draper admitted using marijuana on New 
Year's Eve and on January 9, 2004, it fails to show that she nursed her child at any time in 
close proximity to her use of marijuana. Although the magistrate thought Ms. Draper had 
made a statement "that she smoked and then transmitted it to her child" (R. 66) and that 
there was evidence that Ms. Draper smoked marijuana then nursed her child "within a 
relatively short time of that" (R. 67), the evidence actually shows only that Ms. Draper 
nursed her child on January 20, 2004 and stated that she used marijuana 11 days earlier as 
well as 21 days earlier, and does not show that she nursed the child in close proximity to 
her admitted marijuana use. R. 58. Because some mothers nurse their children 
intermittently and use bottles and other forms of sustenance for four month olds, it is mere 
speculation to assume how much time passed before Ms. Draper nursed her child after 
using marijuana on January 9th, other than that the evidence demonstrates she nursed her 
child eleven days later, on January 20th. 
The trial court, perhaps sensing that the evidence did not show when the nursing 
that gave rise to crime occurred, apparently chose to focus on the proven fact of the 
January 20th nursing, then infer that Ms. Draper must have used marijuana prior to nursing 
rather than inferring that she nursed in close proximity to the January 9th use. R. 58. 
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Since there is no evidence that Ms. Draper used marijuana on any occasion other than the 
two dates she mentioned, the judge's speculation that she must have used drugs before the 
January 20th nursing is not supported by the evidence. In fact, there is no evidence that 
Ms. Draper was under the influence of marijuana or had used marijuana when she met 
with the DCFS investigator. Moreover, the judge's sweeping speculation that because 
Ms. Draper was an admitted drug user, she must have used drugs prior to nursing her 
child subjects Ms. Draper to the rejected label of "status criminal" and improperly makes 
her liable for nursing her child after using drugs at any time, without any showing that she 
used marijuana on the occasion in question. See State v. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, {^20, 
citing Robinson v. California. 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). 
Regardless of whether this crime allegedly occurred on January 9th or January 20th, 
the evidence fails to establish probable cause to believe that Ms. Draper used marijuana in 
close proximity to nursing D.D. In fact, the evidence shows only that she nursed D.D. 
eleven days after using marijuana. If the crime date is January 9th, as alleged in the 
Information, the evidence shows that she nursed him on January 20th. On the other hand, 
if the date of the alleged crime is January 20th, the evidence shows only that she used 
marijuana eleven days earlier. The passage of eleven days between any established use 
and an act of nursing shows that the state did not establish probable cause to believe D.D. 
was exposed to or ingested marijuana. 
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In addition to failing to establish that Ms. Draper nursed D.D. in close proximity to 
her use of marijuana, the state failed to introduce credible evidence that marijuana used by 
Ms. Draper would pass to her child through breast feeding. The only evidence introduced 
by the state to support its claim that by nursing D.D. at some point after using marijuana, 
Ms. Draper caused D.D. to be exposed to or to ingest marijuana was the DCFS 
investigator's statement that she talked to Ms. Draper "about the dangers of using and 
how marijuana and other drugs go through the breast milk to the child." R. 58. As a 
preliminary matter, this testimony when read in context is simply anecdotal background 
information regarding the meeting between Ms. Draper and the investigator, relaying the 
information the investigator gave Ms. Draper. R. 58. The testimony is multiple hearsay 
which in context, was not presented to establish the truth of the matter asserted, i.e. that 
the marijuana would be transmitted through breast milk. Because the investigator's 
rendition of what she told Ms. Draper was multiple hearsay presented as background and 
not for the truth of the matter asserted, it is not credible evidence that marijuana can be 
transmitted to a nursing infant. See Talbot, 972 P.2d at 438 (magistrate must "disregard 
[ ] facially incredible evidence"). 
The investigator's explanation of her discussion with Ms. Draper of the 
transmission of drugs through breast milk is also not credible evidence that marijuana 
passes to an infant through breast feeding because it is not lay witness testimony that was 
rationally based on the investigator's perceptions. See Utah R. Evid. 701. Instead, the 
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testimony obviously required specialized knowledge and therefore qualified as expert 
testimony under Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT 
App 226, 95 P.3d 1193 (trial court abused its discretion in allowing a witness to testify as 
a lay witness where the subject matter required specialized knowledge). The state 
presented no evidence suggesting that the investigator had any specialized knowledge or 
education in this area, and instead simply presented anecdotal hearsay evidence to support 
its claim that Ms. Draper exposed her son or allowed him to ingest marijuana by breast 
feeding him. Because the investigator's lay testimony based on multiple hearsay was not 
credible evidence that marijuana would pass to the infant, the magistrate was required to 
disregard it as part of his role in ferreting out improvident prosecutions. See Talbot 972 
P.2d at 438 (facially incredible evidence must be disregarded in making probable cause 
determination). 
Additionally, even if this evidence were credible, the lack of evidence as to the 
proximity between Ms. Draper's use of marijuana and nursing, the amount of marijuana 
she used, or the time it takes for marijuana to not be found in breast milk show that the 
bindover fails. Had the state presented expert or otherwise credible evidence that 
marijuana can be passed to an infant through breast feeding, it nevertheless was required 
to establish that under the facts of this case, there was probable cause to believe marijuana 
passed through Ms. Draper's breast milk to D.D. The amount of marijuana Ms. Draper 
used, the way in which it was consumed, and the passage of time would necessarily 
45 
impact on this determination. For example, if Ms. Draper inhaled two puffs of marijuana 
and the next morning nursed her child, would there be detectable marijuana in her milk? 
The state's anecdotal and multiple hearsay evidence that was not presented for the truth of 
the matter asserted and instead to explain the conversation between the investigator and 
Ms. Draper failed to establish probable cause to believe that under the circumstances of 
this case, Ms. Draper allowed her child to be exposed to or ingest marijuana. 
Moreover, assuming this Court interprets the child endangerment statute to require 
danger or a significant risk of harm to the child, the evidence presented in this case failed 
to establish that requirement. The state needed to put on credible evidence to establish 
probable cause to believe not only that the marijuana would have passed to the child 
under the circumstances of this case, but also that the impact of the marijuana created 
danger or a significant likelihood of appreciable harm. The state's failure to introduce 
any evidence regarding the impact on a baby who nurses at some point after the mother 
used marijuana required that the bindover be quashed. 
While the standard for bindover is low, the state nevertheless is required to 
introduce credible evidence as to all of the elements of the crime. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 
ffiflO, 15; Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, f23. u'[T]he magistrate's role in this process, 
while limited, is not that of a rubber stamp for the prosecution . . . . Even with this 
limited role, the magistrate must attempt to ensure that all "groundless and improvident 
prosecutions" are ferreted out no later than the preliminary hearing.'"" Clark, 2001 UT 9 
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at 1J10 (citations omitted). In this case where the state's evidence that the marijuana 
would pass to the child was speculation and not admitted for the truth of the matter 
asserted, and the state failed to present credible evidence as to the proximity of the 
nursing to the admitted use of marijuana, the amount of marijuana used, the passage of 
marijuana through breast milk or the impact, if any, on an infant so as to give rise to 
danger or a significant risk of harm, the state failed to establish probable cause to believe 
Ms. Draper committed the crime of child endangerment. 
B. ALTHOUGH THE CHILD ENDANGERMENT CHARGE WAS NOT 
BOUND OVER OR UPHELD UNDER THE STATE'S THEORY THAT 
THE CHILD WAS ENDANGERED BY DRUGS IN PLAIN VIEW, 
EVEN IF IT WERE, THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
PROBABLE CAUSE UNDER THAT THEORY. 
The state's nursing theory is the only arguable basis for upholding the bindover 
since the magistrate bound the case over solely on evidence supporting this theory and the 
trial court likewise relied solely on this theory in upholding the bindover. Nevertheless, 
even if this Court were to consider the state's argument below that drugs in the basement 
created probable cause, the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing failed to 
establish probable cause to believe Ms. Draper committed the crime of child 
endangerment based on marijuana and paraphernalia found in the basement. 
Since the magistrate rejected the state's claim that marijuana found in the basement 
exposed the infant to marijuana and instead bound over the child endangerment charge 
only on the state's nursing theory, the marijuana in the basement theory could not be used 
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to uphold the bindover. See generally State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, 34 P.3d 767 (state 
cannot refile charges dismissed at preliminary hearing unless there is good cause shown or 
new evidence). The magistrate's refusal to bind over the case on the drug theory 
constituted a dismissal and could not later be resurrected as part of defendant's motion to 
quash the bindover on the nursing theory. See id. (allowing state to refile dismissed 
charges only if there is good cause or new evidence); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) & 
(f) (2003) (providing state with the opportunity to appeal in circumstances where it 
believes a magistrate improperly refused to bind over a charge). In this case where the 
magistrate dismissed the state's plain view of drugs theory and the state did not appeal 
that decision or attempt to reinstate the charge on that basis pursuant to good cause or a 
showing of new evidence, the plain view of drugs theory was not a proper basis by which 
the trial court or this Court can uphold the bindover. 
The trial court's reliance solely on the nursing theory for upholding the bindover 
also precludes the use of the state's plain view of marijuana theory for upholding the trial 
court's ruling. In its written materials, the state apparently recognized that the only proper 
basis for upholding the bindover would be a determination by the trial court that there was 
probable cause to bind over Ms. Draper for child endangerment based on the nursing 
theory because it relied on only this theory for upholding the bindover in its written 
memorandum. R. 126. While the state did attempt to orally argue that the trial court 
could uphold the bindover on the plain view of marijuana theory, the trial court apparently 
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rejected this argument since it upheld the bindover solely based on evidence that 
Ms. Draper had nursed her child at some point after using marijuana. R. 168. This 
alternative plain view of marijuana theory for upholding the bindover should therefore not 
be considered by this Court in determining whether there was probable cause to bind over 
Ms. Draper for the child endangerment charge. 
Even if this Court were to consider the state's plain view of marijuana theory, the 
evidence fails to establish probable cause to believe the infant was exposed to the 
contraband in the basement. D.D. was four months old and therefore was not walking or 
moving around the house. His bedroom was upstairs, along with the bedroom of his 
parents. Officers found individually wrapped marijuana, baggies, scales, a pay-owe sheet, 
and paraphernalia in "[a] room downstairs in the basement." R. 48. Although the officer 
did not recall a door to the room, D.D. was not mobile and there is no evidence that he 
was in the room or saw the items. Under these circumstances, the state failed to establish 
probable cause to believe D.D. was exposed to the items. R. 66. 
Additionally, although the state seemed to argue that the items were in plain view 
or visible (R. 65), the state presented no evidence establishing that the contraband was 
visible or in plain view. In fact, the state presented no evidence as to whether the items 
were in plain view or in a cabinet or whether they were out of reach or accessible. The 
only evidence the state presented was that contraband was found in a downstairs room. 
R. 48. Even under an expansive reading of the child endangerment statute to interpret 
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exposure to include contraband in plain view, the state failed to establish probable cause 
because there is no evidence these items were in plain view. 
Moreover, assuming the statute requires danger or a substantial risk of harm, there 
is no evidence that D.D. was endangered in these circumstances. There is no evidence the 
items were in plain view or accessible to D.D. and no evidence that they created a risk to 
him. Accordingly, there was not probable cause to sustain a bindover for child 
endangerment on the state's theory that the infant was exposed to drugs in the basement. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Defendant Becky Lynne Draper respectfully requests that this Court 
hold that Utah's child endangerment statute violates due process or, in the alternative, that 
the state failed to establish probable cause to support a charge of child endangerment, and 
remand the case with an order that the child endangerment charge be dismissed. 
SUBMITTED this /ft*- day of March, 2005. 
JOAN C. WATT 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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West Valley Department * t s r VALLEY DEpJ 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, (Motion to Quash / Declare Utah 
Code § 76-5-112.5 Unconstitutional) 
b'HlQCft)! 
BECKY DRAPER, Case No. -Q&=m2^ 
Defendant. Judge Terry L. Christiansen 
The above matter came before the Court for oral argument on Becky Draper's 
(Defendant) motion to quash bindover / declare Utah Code § 76-5-112.5 unconstitutional on 
September 13, 2004. Lana Taylor appeared on behalf of the State of Utah and Shannon Romero 
appeared on behalf of the Defendant. The Court took the matter under advisement. Having 
reviewed the file and having researched the law pertaining tQ the issue, the Court DENIES the 
Defendant's motion to quash / declare Utah Code § 76-5-112.5 unconstitutional. 
BACKGROUND 
1 On January 9, 2004, Salt Lake County Detective John Wester (Wester) executed a search 
warrant at Defendant's residence, located at 9642 South Garnet Drive, Salt Lake County. 
2 At the time Wester executed the warrant, the Defendant was present with her 4 month old 
child. 
3 During execution of the warrant, Wester discovered individually packaged marijuana and 
packing material for marijuana distribution, e.g., scales, money, a pay/owe sheet, bongs 
and pipes. All of these items, except for the money, was found in the basement. 
4 Defendant stated that her husband, Jimmy Draper, had been selling marijuana for about 
one and a half years. 
5 The items tested positive for marijuana by the State Crime Lab. 
6 Karen Barnes (Barnes), a child protective services investigator for the Division of Child 
and Family Services, received a referral concerning allegations of child endangerment. 
7 Barnes made an unannounced visit to Defendant's residence on January 20, 2004. 
Defendant admitted to Barnes that she had smoked marijuana on New Years Eve and on 
the day Wester executed the search warrant. 
8 While Barnes was interviewing the Defendant, the Defendant began breast feeding her 
child. At that point, Barnes discussed the dangers of using marijuana and how marijuana 
and any other drugs go through the breast milk to the child. The Defendant was not 
aware that marijuana remains in a person's system or that it would go through the breast 
milk to the child. The Defendant indicated that she would not use drugs anymore. 
9 Barnes did not have the Defendant or the child tested for drugs. 
10 On February 9, 2004, Defendant was charged with endangerment of child or elder adult, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-5-112.5. 
11 On May 3, 2004, the Court bound over for trial concluding that there was sufficient 
evidence to find probable cause to believe that Defendant's child was endangered and that 
Defendant committed the crime. 
12 Thereafter, the Defendant filed the present motion to quash / declare Utah Code § 76-5-
112.5 unconstitutional challenging both (1) the constitutionality of the endangerment of 
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child or elder adult statute, § 76-5-112.5 and (2) the quantum of proof produced by the 
State at the preliminary hearing that the Defendant committed the crime of endangerment 
of a child. 
I 
VAGUENESS 
In deciding the constitutionality of a statute, the court must first analyze the plain 
language of the statute. State v. Macguire, 2004 UT 4, ^15, 84 P.3d 1171, 1175. "We need not 
look beyond the plain language unless we find some ambiguity in it." Id at |^15 {citing Utah Sch 
Bds. Ass'n v. State Bd OfEduc, 2001 UT 2, f l3, 17 P.3d 1125). 
Section 76-5-112.5(2) provides: 
Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who knowingly 
or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest 
or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or 
drug paraphernalia as defined in subsection (1), is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree. 
"A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law. . . . When addressing 
such a challenge, this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable 
doubts in favor of constitutionality." State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, p, 31 P.3d 547. 
"Additionally, legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional, and those who challenge 
a statute or ordinance as unconstitutional bear the burden of demonstrating its 
unconstitutionality." State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, T|42 (Internal quotation marks omitted). 
"[VJagueness questions are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the 
statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct." Id at ^43. Where a statute "implicates no 
constitutionally protected conduct, a court will uphold a facial vagueness challenge only if the 
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[statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." State v. Macguire, supra, 2004 UT at 
f 12 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estate v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
494-95 (1982). 
A statute that is clear as applied to a particular complainant cannot be considered 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications and thus will necessarily survive a 
facial vagueness challenge. . . . In order to establish that the complained of 
provisions are impermissibly vague, a defendant must demonstrate either (1) that 
the statutes do not provide the kind of notice that enables ordinary people to 
understand what conduct [is prohibited], or (2) that the statutes encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
Id. at \\!> (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Green, supra, 
2004 UT at f t t . 
"If a statute is sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is 
prohibited, it is not unconstitutionally vague." Id. at [^14. "[A] defendant who engages in some 
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the 
conduct of others." State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App. 326, [^44 (Internal quotation marks omitted). 
"[V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms 
must be examined in light of the facts at hand.. . . Additionally, a court should examine the 
complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law when a 
challenged statute implicates no constitutionally protected conduct." State v. Green, supra, 2004 
UT at |^44 (Citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted). 
Utah courts have upheld statutes with undefined terms that were challenged as 
unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah \9%\)(upheld 
statute where "gross deviation" was undefined); State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App. 54, [^14, 975 
P.2d 489, 496 (Utah App. \999){upheld statute where "delinquent" was undefined); Salt Lake 
City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1265 (Utah App. \991)(upheld statute where "emotional distress" 
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was undefined). 
In State v. Owens, supra, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the statute legitimately 
proscribed a broad spectrum of conduct and the undefined term had a common sense meaning. 
638P.2dat 1184. 
In State v. Krueger, supra, the Court of Appeals of Utah relied upon the widespread 
usage of the terms "delinquency" and "contributing to the delinquency" of a minor to give clear 
and understandable meaning to those terms of the statute. State v. Krueger, supra, 1999 UT 
App. at |^14. The Court of Appeals evaluated the connotation of those terms and whether such 
connotations were "sufficiently well known that persons of ordinary intelligence and judgment 
who desire to do so would have no difficulty in governing their conduct by the statute." Id. at 
115. 
In Salt Lake City v. Lopez, supra, the Court of Appeals of Utah relied upon the statute's 
specific intent requirement and stated that "a specific intent requirement significantly vitiates any 
claim that its purported vagueness could mislead a person of common intelligence into 
misunderstanding what is prohibited." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, supra, 935 P.2d at 1265. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals examined the complainant's conduct before analyzing other 
hypothetical applications of the law to determine whether the statute was unconstitutionally 
applied to the defendant. Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that given the defendant's 
knowledge and conduct, he could not claim that the statute was vague as applied to him, "let 
alone that the statute is totally invalid and incapable of any valid application." Id 
When a term is undefined, the term's ordinary and accepted meaning is often taken from 
the dictionary. See, e.g., Provo City v. Cannon, 1999 UT App. 344,1J13, 994 P.2d 206 {defining 
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"peril" with Webster's Dictionary); State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 996 (Utah App. 
\9&9)(defining "expose" with Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary). 
A 
Section 76-5-112.5(2) is presumed to be constitutional, therefore, Defendant bears a 
heavy burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality. The Court concludes that Defendant fails 
to carry her heavy burden. Section 76-5-112.5(2) clearly gives notice that ordinary people of 
intelligence and judgment who desire to do so would have no difficulty in governing their 
conduct by the statute. Ordinary people of intelligence and judgment reading § 76-5-112.5(2) 
would understand that if a person knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder 
adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, 
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia they are guilty of a third degree felony. 
There is no constitutional right to causing or permitting a child to be exposed to or have 
contact with a controlled substance, a chemical substance or drug paraphernalia, therefore, 
Defendant's facial vagueness challenge will succeed only if the statute is "impermissibly vague 
in all of its applications." State v. Macguire, supra, 2004 UT at 1J12. 
The Defendant contends that the term "exposed" is undefined and therefore, does not 
provide a person of reasonable intelligence with enough detail to know what type of conduct is 
prohibited. The Defendant argues that there is no way of knowing what is meant by the term 
"exposed." The Court does not agree. 
The term "exposed" needs no definition to be constitutional. By not defining the term 
"exposed" the legislature did not "impermissibly delegate basic policy matters to judges and 
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis" as argued by the Defendant. Rather, the 
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legislature allows the fact finder to evaluate the facts of a case and apply the term "exposed" 
using the common sense or ordinary meaning of the term. "Expose" as defined by Webster's is: 
l.a. To remove shelter or protection from; b. To lay open, as to something 
undesirable or injurious. 2. To subject (e.g., a photographic film) to the action of 
light. 3. To make visible . . . 4a. To make known (e.g., a crime); b. To reveal the 
guilt or wrongdoing of. 5. To abandon or put out without shelter or food. 
Random House Webster's dictionary at 250 (4th Ed. 2001); see also Webster's II: New Riverside 
University Dictionary at 452 (1988). 
The statute legitimately reaches a broad spectrum of conduct to allow the fact finder to 
determine under the specific facts of the case whether the child or elder were "exposed" to "a 
controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia." There is no ambiguity in the 
statute and since the plain meaning of the statute is clear using the ordinary and accepted 
meaning of the term "exposed," the Court need not look to the legislative intent. 
Under the facts of this case, the Defendant's residence had packaged marijuana, bongs, 
and pipes. Applying the common sense, ordinary and accepted meaning of the term "exposed," 
the marijuana, bongs and pipes lay open or were visible and the child was not protected from 
them, therefore, the child was "exposed" to the items. Moreover, the intent requirement that the 
Defendant "knowingly or intentionally" exposed the child significantly vitiates the impact of not 
defining the term "exposed" because a person of common intelligence would understand what is 
prohibited. 
Furthermore, the Defendant was nursing her child and was an admitted drug user. An 
inference that the Defendant was using drugs prior to nursing her child is reasonable. Therefore, 
the "ingested" portion of the statute might apply because the Defendant was knowingly and 
intentionally breastfeeding her child, who was ingesting the drugs through the breastmilk. 
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As applied in this case, Section 76-5-112.5(2) is constitutional, therefore, the statute 
cannot be "impermissibly vague in all of its applications" as required to succeed on a vagueness 
challenge. 
Defendant also argues that § 76-5-112.5(2) encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement because there are not minimal guidelines or circumstances where "exposure" occurs 
to guide law enforcement and judges, therefore, they consciously or subconsciously discriminate 
against certain classes of individuals. 
Although the Court need not address this challenge, because the Court previously decided 
that as applied in this case § 76-5-112.5(2) is constitutional, the Court clarifies that § 76-5-
112.5(2) legitimately proscribes a broad spectrum of conduct. To attempt to define guidelines or 
circumstances would be arbitrary. See, e.g., State v. Owens, supra, 638 P 2d at 1184-85 As 
written, § 76-5-112.5(2) avoids arbitrarily narrowing the proscribed conduct and allows the fact 
finder to determine whether under the circumstances the child or elder person was "exposed" to 
"a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia" applying the common sense, 
ordinary and accepted meaning of the term "exposed." 
B 
Defendant also argues that § 76-5-112.5(2) is unconstitutionally vague because the statute 
appears to criminalize potential harm rather than actual harm. Specifically, Defendant argues 
that the mere possibility or risk of "exposure" is sufficient to support the charge, which is 
unconstitutional and cites several non-binding cases The Court is not persuaded 
Based upon the common sense or ordinary meaning of the term "exposed" as stated 
above, a person may decide under the circumstances whether the child or elder adult was 
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"exposed" to the prohibited items. The Court is not inclined to believe that the only harm is 
actual inhalation, ingesting or contact with because the Legislature did include the term 
"exposed," which under the general ordinary meaning of the word includes "to lay open," or 
"make visible," or "to remove shelter or protection from." These definitions are less than actual 
inhalation, ingestion or contact with, but are within the ordinary meaning of "exposed." 
Furthermore, just because a child or elder adult does not inhale, ingest or have contact with the 
prohibited items does not mean that they are not harmed. 
II 
PROBABLE CAUSE 
Alternatively, the Defendant argues that the State failed to demonstrate probable cause to 
believe the Defendant committed the offense of child endangerment. The Court does not agree. 
The "quantum of evidence necessary to support a bindover" is the same as that required 
for issuance of an arrest warrant: "[T]he prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a 
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." State 
v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f^ 16. The Court outlined the magistrate's role, summarizing the 
conclusions of a number of prior cases: 
To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show probable cause at a 
preliminary hearing by presenting sufficient evidence to establish that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it. At this 
stage of the proceeding, the evidence required [to show probable cause] . . . is 
relatively low because the prosecution's case will only get stronger as the 
investigation continues. Accordingly, when faced with conflicting evidence, the 
magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave those tasks to the 
fact finder at trial. Instead, the magistrate must view all evidence in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the prosecution. Yet, the magistrate's role in this process, while limited, is not 
that of a rubber stamp for the prosecution . . Even with this limited role, the 
magistrate must attempt to ensure that all groundless and improvident 
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prosecutions are ferreted out no later than the preliminary. 
Id. at U 10 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted, interpolation by the Court; 
emphasis added). The Clark court held "that to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution 
must still produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged " Id. (Internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Schroyer, 44 P.3d 730, 732 (Utah 2002); State v. 
Robinson, 63 P.3d 105, 106 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
Section 76-5-112.5(2) provides: 
Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who knowingly 
or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest 
or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or 
drug paraphernalia as defined in subsection (1), is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree. 
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in the State's favor, the Court concludes that the State met its burden to bindover to 
show a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it. 
As stated above, supra I. A, the Defendant was nursing her child and was an admitted drug user. 
A reasonable inference that the Defendant was using drugs prior to nursing her child can be 
made, therefore, the "ingested" portion of the statute may apply. Although there was testimony 
that the Defendant did not know that the drugs in her system and would pass to her child when 
she was nursing, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the State and all 
reasonable inferences drawn in the State's favor. The Court concludes that there was enough 
evidence at the preliminary hearing to show that Defendant knowingly or intentionally caused 
her child to ingest or be exposed to a controlled substance, chemical substance or drug 
paraphernalia 
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The Court DENIES Defendant's motion to quash bindover / declare Utah Code § 76-5-
112 5 unconstitutional 
Dated thfeffltflay of Septeft&er, 2004 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
0 0 O 0 0 
FILED 
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Becky Draper, 
Petitioner and Defendant, 
v. 
State of Utah, 
Respondent and Plaintiff, 
ORDER 
Case No. 20040879-CA 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Orme. 
This case is before the court on petitioner Becky Draper's 
petition for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to 
appeal is granted. The parties will be notified when a briefing 
schedule is established. 
(A 
DATED this H day of November, 2004. 
(•('0171 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on November 4, 2004, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered to a personal 
representative of the Attorney General's Office and the Legal 
Defender's Office to be delivered to the parties listed below: 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, WEST VALLEY 
ATTN: KAREN EELLS 
3 63 6 CONSTITUTION BLVD 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
By _ 
Deput'y Clerk 
Case No. 20040879-SC / 
THIRD DISTRICT, WEST VALLEY, 041100301 
ADDENDUM C 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
76-5-112,5. Endangerment of child or elder adult. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Chemical substance" means a substance intended to be used as a 
precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or any other 
chemical intended to be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance. 
Intent under this subsection may be demonstrated by the substance's use, 
quantit}^, manner of storage, or proximity to other precursors, or to 
manufacturing equipment. 
(b) "Child" means the same as that term is defined in Subsection 
76-5-109(l)(a). 
(c) "Controlled substance" means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 58-37-2. 
(d) "Drug paraphernalia" means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 58-37a-3. 
(e) "Elder adult" means the same as that term is defined in Section 
76-5-111. 
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be 
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, 
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1), is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(3) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
violates Subsection (2), and a child or elder adult actually suffers bodily injury, 
substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to, ingestion of, 
inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or 
drug paraphernalia, is guilty of a felony of the second degree unless the 
exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in the death of the child or 
elder adult, in which case the person is guilty of a felony of the first degree. 
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this section that the 
controlled substance was provided by lawful prescription for the child or 
elder adult, and that it was administered to the child or elder adult in 
accordance with the prescription instructions provided with the controlled 
substance. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (4), "prescription" has the same definition 
as in Section 58-37-2. 
ADDENDUM D 
1 MALE: Number 159 the 28 (inaudible) donated one day absence you'll 
2 (inaudible) dangerous. 
3 FEMALE: Senate bill 188 potential for children and elderly Pete Swazzle (?) 
4 this was hurting law enforcement of criminal justice with a vote of eight yes, zero no, 
5 three absent. 
6 MR. SPEAKER: (Inaudible) you are again. 
7 MALE3: I would move to circle that place. 
8 MR. SPEAKER: Motion to circle Senate Bill one, excuse me, (inaudible) Cox 
9 are you prepared to address this bill? 
10 COX: I would withdraw my motion. 
11 MR. SPEAKER: (Inaudible) to withdraw the motion representative. Okay the 
12 bill has been read in and we'll go to representative Cox for presentation of Senate Bill 
13 188. 
14 COX: Thank you Mr. Speaker Potan. I appreciate the opportunity to present this 
15 bill to you. What this basically does is changes the penalties re, related to operating a 
16 Clandestine uh, drug lab that presents significant risks of injury or even potential death to 
17 children, or to the elderly who might uh, be forced actually to live in those conditions. 
18 Uh, if this bill is passed it would be a third degree felony to recklessly or knowingly or 
19 intentionally cause or permit a child or an elderly person to suffer bodily injury from 
20 exposure to a controlled substance, a chemical substance or to drug paraphernalia. The 
1 
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1 second degree felony if there were actually harm caused by the exposure to the illegal 
2 substances. Excuse me. It would be a first degree felony if that child or elderly person 
3 died because of the exposure. It's fairly simple in nature. It's uh, supported by the, the 
4 prosecutor's association, attorney general's office and uh, youth and family specialists 
5 that uh, work in this arena. I'm open for questions. 
6 MR. SPEAKER: Discussion to the bill, representative Bush. 
7 BUSH: May I question the sponsor? 
8 MR. SPEAKER: Sponsor yield? 
9 MALE: Yes. 
10 MR. SPEAKER: Yes you may proceed. 
11 BUSH: What's the, what's the definition of elderly? 
12 MALE: The same, the same definition that is already in statute 
13 representative. 
14 BUSH: What is it? 
15 MALE: I don't know. Nobody wants to say either. 
16 BUSH: Just don't, just don't do anything harmful to me. 
17 MALE: It's line, it's line 52 in the uh, in the bill. Elder adult means the same 
18 as that term defined in Section 76-5-111. I don't have that opened right now. 
19 MR. SPEAKER: To the bill, representative Dillary? 
20 DILLARY: Uh yes my question is there's no fiscal note on the bill and under 
2 
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1 normal circumstances when we increase uh, penalties or enhance uh, bring on a new 
2 felony or something this would involve incarceration and there would be a, a financial 
3 impact. 
4 MALE: We (inaudible) 
5 MR. SPEAKER: Did you want him to yield the question? 
6 DILLARY: Yes, 
7 MR. SPEAKER: Okay. 
8 DILLARY: I want him to address why there isn't one. 
9 MR. SPEAKER: (Inaudible) Cox will you yield? 
10 COX: Yes. 
11 MR. SPEAKER: Yes, go ahead. 
12 COX: Thank you. Fiscal analysts indicated this could be done with in current 
13 budgets. 
14 DILLARY: That's a first. 
15 MR. SPEAKER: Thank you representative Wright to the bill. 
16 WRIGHT: Thank you would sponsor yield? 
17 MALE: I'll try. 
18 WRIGHT: Representative Cox 
19 MR. SPEAKER: (inaudible) you may proceed. 
20 WRIGHT: You say we enhance the penalties, what, what were they previously 
3 
'.<vi,08S 
1 and what are the enhancing to? 
2 COX: ...Anywhere from uh, misdemeanors to third degree felonies. 
3 WRIGHT: Previously to now so this, this makes all these third degree felonies 
4 and what, what's the difference I guess. 
5 COX: No. The difference now is that if the bi, if the individual creates that um, 
6 that condition, that and they do that recklessly, knowingly or intentionally, uh cause or 
7 permit a child or an elderly person to suffer bodily injury from exposure to those 
8 substances, be a second degree felony if there was actual harm caused. If death resulted 
9 as, as a result of that condition then it's a first degree felony. 
10 WRIGHT: So what would be the penalty for just having a drug lab now? 
11 COX: It's just a misdemeanor for just having a uh, lab. 
12 WRIGHT: So it still would be a misdemeanor except we just, uh, and I su, I 
13 support you know what we're trying to do but I'm wondering why, why don't we just 
14 raise the penalties for having the drug lab in the first place. What, what you did wfas 
15 actually if you had bodily harm, so you have to prove some type of bodily harm and then 
16 it enhances the penalty rather then 
17 COX: If, if there's, if there's actual cause of injury or death it enhances the 
18 penalty, yes. 
19 WRIGHT: The question I would have is this a good way, why don't we just 
20 raise the penalty for a drug lab? You know maybe I'm a little naive for having it in the 
4 
^00089 
1 first place, whether we 
2 MALE: I, I think that's another bill that uh, representative uh, Tyler has 
3 worked on quite a bit. 
4 WRIGHT: Okay. Thank you. 
5 MR. SPEAKER: Thank you for the discussions representative Dayton. 
6 DAYTON: Thank you Mr. Speaker, will sponsor yield? 
7 MR. SPEAKER: Will the sponsor yield? 
8 MALE: Absolutely. 
9 MR. SPEAKER Yes you may proceed. 
10 DAYTON: I, I'd like to pursue the questions that representative Wright had only 
11 because um, somewhere between child and elderly, um there are a lot of people that don't 
12 know about meth labs or even the danger that's involved in them and I'm uh, presuming 
13 the way the bill is written is if a child or an elderly person wouldn't be able to remove 
14 themselves from a situation, but, but a lot of people wouldn't, wouldn't know to. Until it 
15 was too late, um, I'm, I'm just confused about that, would you ad, address that concern? 
16 MALE: These are, these are the people that are vulnerable that generally 
17 don't have the choice, they're, they either don't have a choice because they're too young 
18 or they're frightened, not able to leave, uh, their own children will be ere, creating the 
19 hazard in their home and they're concerned about being able to have anywhere else to go, 
20 um, because they have nowhere else to go. 
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1 DAYTON: Thank you. 
2 MR. SPEAKER: For the discussion of the bill representative CURTIS. 
3 CURTIS: Thank you Mr. Speaker, I would like to reserve the right to make a 
4 motion. 
5 MR. SPEAKER: You made (inaudible) and reserve that right. 
6 CURTIS: Thank you Mr. Speaker and will the sponsor yield to a question? 
7 MR. SPEAKER: Do you yield representative Cox? 
8 COX: Reluctantly. 
9 MR. SPEAKER: You may proceed. 
10 CURTIS: Um, it appears that in the a committee that, well it appears that the 
11 original intent of the bill was to go after intentional cont, con, conduct, um and the 
12 committee knowing or intentional conduct, the committee edited the criminal copeability 
13 standard of reckless, recklessly exposing somebody. Could you help me understand, 
14 what, why uh, they were going in that direction? 
15 MALE: I think that's consistent with other, with language in other crimes. 
16 That they recklessly, knowingly or intentionally, that, that's consistent with the criminal 
17 code you're quite aware of that. 
18 CURTIS: Well it's not consistent, representatives, if Mr. Speaker if I could 
19 place my motion to amend. 
20 MR. SPEAKER: You may proceed. 
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1 CURTIS: On the golden rod copy line 53,1 would simply move to delete 
2 recklessly, and if I may speak to that. 
3 MR. SPEAKER: You may, uh, let me repeat that, on, on the golden rod copy 
4 line 53 we delete the word recklessly. 
5 CURTIS: Yes. 
6 MR. SPEAKER: Okay you may proceed with explanation. 
7 CURTIS: Thank you uh, Mr. Speaker. Representatives in the criminal code 
8 there's a, there's a chapter entitled Chapter 2 which is principles of criminal 
9 responsibility and then copeability is defined and you have a generally four standards of 
10 criminal copeability. You have an intentional, a knowingly, a reckless or with criminal 
11 negligence. And what we've done here in this bill is we've elevated the penalties, and 
12 we've taken three of the four criminal standards of copeability. I think if somebody 
13 intentionally or knowingly exposes somebody to these chemicals that they should have 
14 some elevated principles, elevated copeability, but a reckless exposure to then say we're 
15 going to elevate it, not every crime is as a reckless crime. When representative Cox says 
16 well, I, I am familiar with the criminal code and that's why you have different levels of, 
17 you have homicide, and you have manslaughter, and you have negligent homicide and 
18 you have different levels based upon the copeability, but we've lumped all the 
19 copeability together and elevated the penalties. I'm asking to take that one level of 
20 copeability off and a reckless standard saying we did an intentional and knowingly and 
7 
1 uncomfortable with elevating the standard. But I'm not comfortable in elevating the 
2 penalty if we're going to lower the standards to. 
3 MR. SPEAKER: Representative Cox response to motion to amend? 
4 COX: Thank you Mr. Speaker Protam. I'd resist the motion, uh, this was 
5 recommended by the prosecutors. You got to recognize that when these individuals that 
6 have created this situation, this dangerous, dangerous situation, oft times they are under 
7 the influence of the drug themselves and what they do they do recklessly. We need to 
8 hold them copeable. We need to hold them accountable for that. And it should be at a 
9 higher level because of the danger that they're placing these small children and these 
10 elderly adults in. It's worthy of an elevated penalty. And I'd resist the motion on that. 
11 MR. SPEAKER: Further discussion to the motion to amend. Seeing none, 
12 representative Curtis for summation on your motion. 
13 CURTIS: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I agree with representative Cox, it's worthy 
14 of an elevated penalty. It's not worthy of a lower standard of copeability. There's a 
15 distinction and there's a difference and when you as, and when you go in to do establish 
16 how somebody did something if you're driving negligently and you kill somebody that's 
17 different then if you intentionally kill somebody. What we're doing is we're lumping all 
18 the standards of copeability together to get an elevated penalty. And I (tape went out). 
19 Thank you. 
20 MR. SPEAKER: We'll place the motion to amend. The amendment is on the 
8 
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1 golden rod copy line 53 we delete the word recklessly. All in favor of the motion to 
2 amend say I. 
3 GROUP: I 
4 MR. SPEAKER: Opposed no. 
5 GROUP: No. 
6 MR. SPEAKER: Sheriff rules, the motion carries. Five or more standing? 
7 Five or more standing be in division. Voting is open.... Having voted we'll close the 
8 vote. Voting will be closed. Motion to Amend having received 39 yes notes and 24 no 
9 votes passes. Good ears as usual. Further discussion to the bill. Seeing none, 
10 representative Cox for summation on the bill. 
11 COX: Thank you Mr. Speaker Potan. Law enforcement has been working very 
12 hard to clean up the meth labs in our communities. This provides them with the 
13 opportunity, a better tool to do that, to be better enforcers of the laws that we as a body 
14 have enacted. Uh, I'd appreciate your positive vote on this bill. 
15 MR. SPEAKER: Thank you, voting is open on Senate Bill 188.... Seeing all 
16 present having voted we'll close the vote. Senate Bill 188 having received 67 yes votes 
17 and 0 no votes will be returned to the senate for further action. Representative Norris 
18 Stevens. , ^ ^ , - ^ - ^ r r 
19 FEMALE: House Bill 125 endangerment of child or elder person with 
20 controlled substance or precursor Trisha Beck. This was heard in judiciary with a vote of 
0 0 
1 9 yes and 0 no 4 absent. 
2 MR. SPEAKER: Representative Beck. 
3 BECK: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Urn, actually there were two oversights 
4 either section dealing with endangerment of a child or an elder adult and this bill merely 
5 corrects those oversights from the problems. The first problem is that the section 
6 contains an all court proof requirement. It's obviously intended to cover the situation 
7 where a person knowingly and intentionally gives a child or elder adult a controlled 
8 substance and there by exposes him of or her to injury. This section should have simply 
9 made it illegal to expose them to a non-prescribed controlled substance. Obviously they 
10 have already determined that the controlled substances are risky to an individual's health, 
11 otherwise they would not be a controlled substance. The same is true with the drug 
12 paraphernalia and chemicals used to making illegal drugs. The current language 
13 unintentionally requires the prosecutor to present scientific evidence to show that the 
14 controlled substances are dangerous. That's not only expensive but it's also ridiculous to 
15 spend all their time trying to show that. The other oversight in this section is that it 
16 contains no exceptions for drugs which are administered in accordance with the 
17 prescription from a (inaudible) physician. This bill also fixes that problem as it says in 
18 the last two paragraphs. So this also urn, passed through the committee, um on it as a 
19 consensus bill, as on, it passed through the committee unanimously. So with that, that 
20 I'm open for any questions. 
10 
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1 MR. SPEAKER: Discussion to House Bill 125. See no lights. Uh, voting is 
2 open on House Bill 125.... Sorry about that. Representative Beck waives summation. 
3 It's obviously getting late.... Seeing all present, representative Murray, representative 
4 Addaire, Senurey, Senior, Senate Bowman, I think the time's getting near, representative 
5 Hanson, seeing all present and having voted Senate Bowman. Voting will be closed. 
6 House Bill 125 having received 71 yes votes 0 no votes passes this body and referred to 
7 the Senate for further consideration. Madam Reading Clerk. 
8 MALE: Senate Bill 188 ' 7 
9 FEMALE: Senate Bill 188 protection for children and elderly, Senator Swazzle. 
10 MALE: Senator Swazzle. 
11 SWAZZLE: And thank you Ms. President, uh this bill uh, as we discussed 
12 yesterday addresses a very serious issue and that is the production of methamphetamines. 
13 This bill would uh, put in place a series of penalties for those clandestine drug operators 
14 as they manufacture these uh, illegal drugs and would put in place a penalty of a third 
15 degree if they knowingly or intentionally cause or permit a child or elder to suffer bodily 
16 injury. Second degree felony if they actually are harmed and a first degree felony if that 
17 child or elder actually dies as a result of those illegal substances. 
18 MALE: Questions for Senator Swazzle. (Inaudible) questions being called. 
19 Senate Bill 188 pass roll call. 
20 FEMALE: (inaudible) Ellett 
11 
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1 ELLETT: I 
2 FEMALE: Blackham, 
3 BLACKHAM I 
4 FEMALE: Davis... Demetris 
5 DEMETRIS: I 
6 FEMALE: Bev Evans ... Bart Evans 
7 BART EVANS: I 
8 FEMALE- Vel 
9 VEL: I 
10 FEMALE: Callowell 
11 CALLOWELL: I 
12 FEMALE: Villiard 
13 VILLIARD: I 
14 FEMALE: Al 
15 AL: I 
16 FEMALE: Holt 
17 HOLT: I 
18 FEMALE: Jones 
19 JONES: I 
20 FEMALE: Julander... Knutsen 
12 
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1 KNUTSEN: I 
2 FEMALE: Densel... Maine 
3 MAINE: I 
4 FEMALE: Montgomery 
5 MONTGOMERY: I 
6 FEMALE: Nielstein 
7 NIELSTEIN: I 
8 FEMALE: Nielsen 
9 NIELSEN: I 
10 FEMALE: Peterson 
11 PETERSON: I 
12 FEMALE: Knovvlton 
13 KNOWLTON: I 
14 • FEMALE: Stanford... Steele 
15 STEELE: I 
16 FEMALE: Stevenson 
17 STEVENSON: I 
18 FEMALE: Swazzle 
19 SWAZZLE: I 
20 FEMALE: Valentine 
13 
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1 VALENTINE: I 
2 FEMALE: Waddit 
3 WADDIT: I 
4 FEMALE: (inaudible) Bailey 
5 BAILEY: I 
6 MALE: Senate Bill 188 has 27 I votes, no nay votes two being absent. 
7 Passes to the third reading count. Excuse me, passes to the house for their consideration. 
8 Next bill sub 
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9 MR. PRESIDENT: (inaudible) House Bill 125. y 
10 FEMALE: House Bill 125 endangerment of child or elder person with 
11 controlled substance or precursor representative Beck, Senator Julander. 
12 MR PRESIDENT: Senator Julander. 
13 JULANDER: Thank you Mr. President, we've had uh, several discussions 
14 on this bill and we're trying to correct two oversights that had been in the uh, code um, to 
15 the present. The first problem was, was the awkward proof of requirement and we solved 
16 that yesterday with Senator uh, Valentines amendment, uh and um, the other was the um, 
17 the section that contains no exemption for drugs which are, are administered in 
18 accordance with the prescription from a physician. So unless there are any questions. 
19 MR. PRESIDENT: Any questions for Senator Julander on this bill? ... See non 
20 Senator. 
14 
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1 JULANDER: (inaudible) with the question that uh, 
2 MR PRESIDENT: Question is should House Bill 125 pass? Roll call vote. 
3 FEMALE: Senator Allen .. Ron Allen 
4 ALLEN: I 
5 FEMALE: Blancum.. (inaudible) 
6 MALE: I 
7 FEMALE: Brothers 
8 BROTHERS: I 
9 FEMALE: Davis 
10 DAVIS: I 
11 FEMALE: Demitrige 
12 DEMITRIGE: I 
13 FEMALE: Eastman 
14 EASTMAN: I 
15 FEMALE: Ericks 
16 ERICKS: I 
17 FEMALE: Gregra 
18 GREGRA: I 
19 FEMALE: Hale... Halerow 
20 HALEROW: I 
15 
1 FEMALE: Hickman ...Hillyard 
2 HILLYARD: I 
3 FEMALE: Jokums 
4 JOKUMA: I 
5 FEMALE: Julander 
6 JULANDER: I 
7 FEMALE: Knudson 
8 KNUDSON: I 
9 FEMALE: Maine 
10 MAINE: I 
11 FEMALE: Peterson 
12 PETERSON: I 
13 FEMALE: Polton 
14 POLTON: I 
15 FEMALE: Spencer 
16 SPENCER: I 
17 FEMALE: Steele 
18 STEELE: I 
19 FEMALE: Stevenson 
20 STEVENSON: I 
16 
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1 FEMALE: Swazzle 
2 SWAZZLE: I 
3 FEMALE: Valentine 
4 VALENTINE: I 
5 FEMALE: Claudertz 
6 CLAUDERTZ: I 
7 FEMALE: Walker 
8 WALKER: I 
9 FEMALE Wright 
10 WRIGHT: I 
11 FEMALE: (inaudible) 
12 MALE: I 
13 MR. PRESIDENT: House Bill 125 is received 26 I votes no nay votes three being 
14 absent, passes. Will be referred back to the House for further consideration as it was 
15 amended. We'll now go to 
17 
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*** ARCHIVE DATA*** 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2000 GENERAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS THROUGH 2000 UT 86 AND 2000 UT APP 291 *** 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 5. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 
PART 1. ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2000) 
§ 76-5-112.5. Endangerment of child or elder adult 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "chemical substance" means a substance used as a precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or 
any other chemical, as demonstrated by its use, quantity, manner of storage, or proximity to other precursors, or to 
manufacturing equipment which was intended to be used in the manufacture of controlled substances; 
(b) "child" means the same as that term is defined in Subsection 76-5-109(l)(a); 
(c) "controlled substance" means the same as that term is defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(d) "drug paraphernalia" means the same as that term is defined in Section 58-37a-3; and 
(e) "elder adult" means the same as that term is defined in Section 76-5-111. 
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who knowingly or intentionally causes or 
permits a child or elder adult to be at risk of suffering bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury 
from exposure to, ingestion of, inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug 
paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1), is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(3) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who violates Subsection (2), and a child or 
elder adult actually suffers bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to, ingestion of, 
inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia, is guilty of a felony of 
the second degree unless the exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in the death of the child or elder adult, in 
which case the person is guilty of a felony of the first degree. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-5-112.5, enacted by L. 2000, ch. 187, § 2. 
NOTES: 
EFFECTIVE DATES -Laws 2000, ch. 187 became effective on May 1, 2000, pursuant to Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 
25. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. --Prosecution of mother for prenatal substance abuse based on endangerment of or delivery of controlled 
substance to child, 70 A L R 5th 461 
